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**PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT**

**BURKINA FASO**

**PARTNERSHIP FOR NATURAL ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT  
(GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY)  
TF051242**

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*Sector Evaluation Division  
Independent Evaluation Group*

## Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = *Communaute Financiere Africaine Franc – CFA Franc BCEAO (XOF)*

1998	US\$1.00	XOF 590	2003	US\$1.00	XOF 581
1999	US\$1.00	XOF 616	2004	US\$1.00	XOF 528
2000	US\$1.00	XOF 712	2005	US\$1.00	XOF 527
2001	US\$1.00	XOF 733	2006	US\$1.00	XOF 523
2002	US\$1.00	XOF 697	2007	US\$1.00	XOF 479

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

APL	Adaptable Program Lending
CBRD	Community Based Rural Development Project
DANIDA	
EMP	Environmental Management Plan
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IKA	l'indice kilométrique d'abondance des populations des mammifères (Kilometrical Abundance Index of mammals' populations)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MECV	Ministry of the Environment and Quality of Life
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OP	Operational Policies
PA	Protected Areas
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PAGEN	Partnership for Improved Management of Natural Ecosystems
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
REDD	Program for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
STAR	System for Transparent Allocation of Resources
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WBG	World Bank Group
WCU	Wildlife Conservation Unit
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

## Fiscal Year

Government: January 1 to December 31

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**IEGWB Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation.**

### **About this Report**

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEGWB annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEGWB staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEGWB peer review, Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank department. IEGWB incorporates the comments as relevant. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

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**Outcome:** The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. *Possible ratings for Outcome:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Risk to Development Outcome:** The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

**Bank Performance:** The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Borrower Performance:** The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.



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This report was prepared by Ms. Lauren Kelly who assessed the project in July 2009. Romyne Pereira and Marie Charles provided administrative support and Tariq Chfadi assisted with the mission and stakeholder interviews.

## Principal Ratings

### Partnership for Natural Ecosystem Management (P052400)

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Significant	High	High
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

\* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEGWB product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

## Key Staff Responsible

<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
Appraisal	Jean-Michel Pavy	Richard Scobey	A.David Craig
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## Preface

This is the Project Performance Assessment Report prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the *Partnership for Natural Ecosystem Management* project. A grant from the Global Environment Facility in the amount of US\$7.50 million to the Government of Burkina Faso was approved by the World Bank Board of Directors on May 21, 2002. At appraisal the total project cost was estimated to be US\$13.46 million, with US\$1.68 million contributed by the Government of Burkina Faso, US\$0.59 contributed by local communities, and US\$3.68 million projected co-financing from the IDA funded Community Based Rural Development project and other parallel donor funded projects (supported by the Netherlands and the African Development Bank). The final actual project cost was US\$13.20 million. The Global Environment Facility grant was fully disbursed.

An input into IEG's Review of the World Bank's Safeguard Policies, this report draws lessons on the design and implementation of safeguards, particularly pertaining to the environmental and social sustainability of the World Bank's biodiversity conservation portfolio, in this case in West Africa.

IEG prepared this report based on an examination of the relevant Project Appraisal Document, Implementation Completion Report, the grant agreement, project files and archives, as well as other relevant reports, memoranda, and working papers. Discussions were also held with Bank staff in both Washington D.C. and in Burkina Faso. An IEG field mission visited Burkina Faso in July 2009, conducted site visits, and discussed both the project and the effectiveness of Bank assistance with relevant officials and other stakeholders. The mission appreciates the support and attention given by client officials well as the Bank's office in Ouagadougou.

The draft report is being sent to the appropriate government entities for comments, which will be taken into account in finalizing the text and annexed to the report.



## Summary

The objective of the \$13.46 million *Partnership for Natural Ecosystem Management project* (PAGEN) was to reverse biodiversity trends in priority protected areas. Financed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) at a level of US\$7.5 million and executed by the World Bank, the project was designed to help implement Burkina Faso's National Natural Ecosystem Management Program, a part of the country's decentralized rural development program. The GEF project is associated with the Bank-supported *Community-based Rural Development Project*, with which a memorandum of understanding was signed. The intent of PAGEN was to help extend the benefits derived from the country's decentralized rural development program to the populations residing along the peripheries of its protected areas.

Designed as an Adjustable Program Loan, the project would be implemented over three phases: Phase One – Reverse biodiversity trends in priority protected areas; Phase Two – Substantially improve biodiversity in priority protected areas; and Phase Three – Secure biodiversity in protected areas. However the second and third phases have not materialized.

The project had three main components: (1) National Capacity Building for support for the decentralized management of protected areas; (2) Local Capacity Building for the management of protected areas; and (3) Program Administration and Monitoring. It sought to build national capacity by assisting with the updating of legislation that lagged behind the country's rural and environment policy reforms, such as the 1997 Forestry Code, its accompanying directives, and institutions. At the local level, it would build village and inter-village level capacity for the management of the protected area systems by supporting the development of community associations called Inter-Village Protected Area Management Associations that could then become entrusted as concessionaires.

Protected area management effectiveness was measured against two key indicators: a decrease in agricultural encroachment and an increase in selected species in the protected areas targeted by the project. The project helped strengthen the capacity of local concessionaires, including local village level associations and NGOs, to better manage the protected areas. As a result of the project, agricultural encroachment decreased across all targeted protected areas: there was no crop cultivation within the boundaries of protected areas at the end of the project in all the Wildlife Conservation Units except for the Sahel Unit, where cultivation dropped from 20 to 13 percent during the course of the project. And there was a recorded increase in the number of almost all species monitored across all Wildlife Conservation Units. Management plans supported by the project were developed and a number of activities to promote alternative livelihoods in and around the protected areas were put in place. But due to the nature of the phased approach of this project, none of the investments that were needed to implement the management plans and secure the areas financially were made. Although women were specifically targeted in the design of this project, their role particularly in relation to village-level decision-making was limited.

Overall implementation was challenged by three aspects of the project: the assumption that a long term program for biodiversity conservation would be supported which dictated the sequencing of activities and investments; the mid-course decision to resettle persons to create elephant migration corridors without having worked out a proper resettlement framework that ensured sufficient funds for compensation; and the lack of effective coordination between PAGEN and the Community-based Rural Development Project.

Project relevance is rated **Substantial**. The project objective, to reverse biodiversity loss, is rated **Substantially Relevant**. The objective at the time of project design was in line with the country's Biodiversity Strategy and National Natural Ecosystem Management Program whose aim is to support biodiversity in priority protected areas to sustainably benefit peripheral communities' local development. The objective was also in line with Burkina Faso's 2000 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper that identified sustainable management of natural resources as one of the major pillars for combating poverty. Absolute poverty in Burkina Faso is predominantly a rural phenomenon: Eight-four percent of the population resides in rural areas and persons living around the peripheries of the country's protected areas are especially vulnerable. Today however, while PAGEN's objective is still viewed as highly relevant by the Government, financing for natural resource and protected area management has become more constrained due to the need to respond to the food crisis and (to a lesser extent) the financial crisis. Therefore, PAGEN beneficiaries will continue to be somewhat supported by a component lodged in an IDA funded food security program, although to a more limited extent than through PAGEN.

The decline in the project's relevance following the food crises is in part due to its **Modest Design** – a design that lacked a framework to track rural livelihood gains despite the fact that it was supposed to contribute to peripheral communities' local development. The design is also rated modest because it was prepared in a manner that over-relied on subsequent phases of support – from the GEF (which would require GEF CEO approval) and IDA. This severely raised beneficiary expectations who fully participated in the first phase of the program. It also over-relied on effective cooperation with the Community Based Rural Development Project. While the original project design was squarely set in the country's socio-cultural context - the focus on village and inter-village capacity building for protected area management was in line with the country's decentralized rural development process underway- the relevance of design was weakened when decisions were taken to move away from capacity building towards the creation of the corridors. The decision was made in the face of insufficient resources for compensation and an overall level of uncertainty as to whether future support to sustain the corridors would be available.

Efficacy is rated **Substantial**. Designed as a fifteen-year program, PAGEN achieved its first phase objective by supporting the Government in creating the enabling environment for community-based protected area management. Although the Forestry Code has not been fully adopted and put into implementation, the project supported the formulation of forest related decrees, and helped to raise awareness about the code by disseminating it through local workshops. The Bank also supported the formulation of a National Program for the Management of Wildlife and Protected Areas the associated Action Plan. The project achieved substantial progress against two core biodiversity-related indicators.

Agricultural encroachment in protected areas was substantially reduced and fully eliminated in some areas and the number of animals targeted in the Wildlife Conservation Units increased.

Project Efficiency is rated **Modest**. This is a GEF financed World Bank executed project that was required to conduct an incremental cost assessment at appraisal, rather than an economic or financial rate of return. While an incremental cost assessment was conducted at design, there was no calculation of efficiency or cost-effectiveness at completion. Decisions taken during the latter part of project implementation stretched the project too thin. Rather than consolidate activities in the face of declining project resources due to depreciation, the project team expanded them, creating two elephant migration corridors without allowing for adequate compensation for resettled persons and with the knowledge that the second and third phases of the project that would ensure follow-up would not be forthcoming.

The overall outcome of the project was **Moderately Satisfactory**. A substantially relevant project at the time of appraisal whose objectives were in line with the country's biodiversity related frameworks and poverty alleviation strategies, the project lost support towards completion due to domestic challenges posed by the food crisis. The project was designed in a relevant manner in line with the country's rural decentralization efforts, socio-cultural context, and relative capacities. However decisions taken after mid-term lessened the relevance of project design since the decision strayed from the original capacity development aims of the project towards the creation of elephant migration corridors. This decision was taken late in the project cycle, in the face of dollar depreciation, resulting in the Bank's inability to assure proper mitigation of its social safeguards. Yet the project achieved its objective of reversing biodiversity trends, by helping to strengthen the capacity of the village and inter-village committees to promote enhanced natural resource management and community management of the protected areas. The project successfully reduced agricultural encroachment and increased biodiversity in all areas in which it worked. There is however a high risk that these outcomes will not be sustained.

Bank performance is rated **Moderately Unsatisfactory**. The project was technically sound and was firmly rooted in Burkinabe customs and the country's decentralization strategy although it took twice as long to prepare as planned. The Moderately Unsatisfactory rating is based on Moderately Satisfactory quality at entry but Moderately Unsatisfactory supervision. IEG recognizes the day-do-day supervision carried out by the project team based in Ouagadougou that was instrumental in helping to achieve results on the ground. However the serious lack of compliance with the Bank's policy on resettlement and the resulting safeguards violation during supervision calls for the supervision rating to outweigh the Moderately Satisfactory quality of entry rating, leading to an overall Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for Bank performance.

The Borrower performance rating is **Moderately Satisfactory**. The Government implemented a number of innovative institutional and legal measures to further the effective management of the country's protected areas, including a national anti-poaching strategy and the ongoing updating of the forest code. It also enabled the involvement of local communities in protected area management and decision-making. Government co-financing equaled 25-30 percent of the actual GEF contribution and an additional

allocation was provided to partially compensate for financial loss due to the depreciation of the dollar. While the Government also took on the responsibility of compensating resettled communities, compensation fell short of standards set by the World Bank's operational policy. The biological corridors created and demarcated with project assistance should not have been put in place without the means to properly compensate the resettled beneficiaries.

Risk to development outcome is rated **High**. The results of the implementation of PAGEN's first phase, including some 578,176 ha of newly protected area created by the project, are unlikely to be sustained without follow-on projects. The decision not to implement the subsequent phases has resulted in a high risk to the sustainability of the outcomes achieved.

An input into IEG's Review of the World Bank's Safeguard Policies, this PPAR draws lessons on the design and implementation of safeguards, particularly pertaining to the Bank's biodiversity conservation portfolio. These lessons are:

- **Protected area projects supported by the World Bank need to ensure that other means of finance, apart from the GEF, are woven into the project design in case contingency resources are needed to ensure that negative impacts on human livelihoods are mitigated.** Biodiversity conservation projects that seek to enlarge or create protected areas or conservation corridors always involve a change in access by rural residents to natural resources and sometime involve physical resettlement. Proper valuation of livelihoods and sufficient project costing for the restoration of these livelihoods are essential and should be firmly figured into project design. GEF stand-alone projects are less equipped to finance the costs of restoring livelihoods since GEF is an incremental financing instrument designed to provide global environmental benefits.
- **The Bank's Safeguard on Indigenous Peoples is not comprehensive enough to cover vulnerable groups that may be affected by a project.** Biodiversity conservation projects that limit access to resources, including water and grazing rights of nomadic groups and herders, need to highlight the particular needs of these groups in the social assessment and work with the respective client governments to formulate appropriate mitigation strategies. The Bank's resettlement policies should be applied on a contextual basis so that, where appropriate, seasonal and climatic migration is taken into account in figuring the number of project affected persons.
- Projects with small grants programs typically indicate that since the activities will be chosen downstream, environmental management plans will need to be designed at the time when activities are selected, and that the management plans must be designed in consultation with the beneficiaries. The project level Environment Management Plan is often modeled as a framework process that provides guidelines on how to develop EMPs at the site or activity level. Guidelines include information concerning Bank standards on participation and inclusion, conflict resolution, monitoring and evaluation. However, for this system to be effectively implemented, **adequate and upfront assessment is**

**needed of EIA capacity at the village and inter-village level, including both capacity for assessment and capacity to mitigate harm (technical and financial capacity).**

Vinod Thomas  
Director-General  
Evaluation





# 1. Background

1.1 Burkina Faso is one of the world's poorest countries. At the time when the *Partnership for Natural Ecosystem Management* (PAGEN) was designed, per capita GDP was US\$240 and the country ranked 172 out of 175 on the UNDP's Human Development Index (1997). By project close in 2008, per capita GDP had only risen to US\$440 and the country's human development ranking remained relatively the same: Burkina Faso was ranked as one of the ten least developed countries in the world in 2009, or 177 out of a total 182 country rankings. Absolute poverty in Burkina Faso is predominantly in rural areas, where 84 percent of the population resides. Nearly half the population lack adequate food and essential goods and services. The poor spend 58 percent of their budget on food, mainly millet and sorghum (World Bank 2002). And to survive, more than 80 percent of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. They also rely on internal and regional migration.

1.2 Due to these severe human constraints, Burkina Faso's national policies treat support for protected area management as an integral part of its overarching decentralized rural development strategy with an emphasis on local community development through the rational management and use of natural resources (such as forests and non-timber forest products, wildlife, and aquatic resources). At the time of project design, the Government of Burkina Faso had put in place critical policies, such as the Wildlife Sector Reform (1995), the National Biological Diversity Strategy (2000), and the Letter for Decentralized Rural Development (2001) that laid the framework for community based management of protected areas in the context of the country's overall rural development aims. To implement this vision, of integrating protected area management into the country's overall rural development strategy, the Government developed the National Natural Ecosystem Management Program and registered it under the National Policy for Decentralized Rural Development.

1.3 PAGEN, financed by the Global Environment Facility and executed by the World Bank, was designed to help implement the National Natural Ecosystem Management Program. It was designed to help update legislation that lagged behind the country's new rural and environment policy reforms – such as the 1997 Forestry Code (Law 006/97/ADP), its accompanying directives, and institutions. It was also designed to reinforce the aims of the *Community-based Rural Development Project* (CBRD), a World Bank financed project under implementation, by targeting the rural populations that reside along the peripheries of the country's protected areas.

1.4 As part of the government reforms, a number of innovative institutional and legal measures had been put in place to enable local communities to become concessionaires of the country's protected areas. PAGEN was designed to help build village and inter-village level capacity for the management of the protected area systems by supporting the development of community associations called Inter-Village Protected Area Management Associations that could then become entrusted as concessionaires. The members of these associations are representatives of the *Comites Villageois de Gestion du Terroir* of all villages located in the periphery of a protected area. Protected areas within a WCU are placed under the coordination of a Forestry Department Conservator and daily

management of each protected area is entrusted to a concessionaire (private firm, NGO, or a community based association).

1.5 The ultimate aim of the Bank's engagement was to help the Government put in place long term sustainable financing mechanisms for the management of the protected areas targeted by the project. While it was envisioned that some protected areas could attract revenues through tourism and safari hunting and, to a lesser extent, through the development of sustainable alternative livelihoods, such as honey making and firewood production, others would require additional funds set aside in trust or through foundational support.

## 2. Objectives and Components

2.1 The overall 15 year objective of the *Partnership for Natural Ecosystem Management* project was to secure biodiversity in priority protected areas. The project had one combined global environment and development objective. The global environment and development objectives of the three planned phases were also combined: Phase One: Reverse biodiversity trends in priority protected areas; Phase Two: Substantially improve biodiversity in priority protected areas; and Phase Three: Secure biodiversity in priority protected areas. This report assesses the first phase, implemented between April 2002 and May 2008.

### Objective

2.2 The objective of the project's first phase was to *reverse biodiversity trends in priority protected areas*. The first phase was designed to lay the foundation for effective management of protected areas. Its activities included identification of the areas, preparation of protected area management plans, with some implementation envisioned. However actual investments were to be provided in the second and third phase. These investments would include services or small works including tracing protected area limits, tourism and surveillance infrastructure, building rural roads and trails for surveillance and tourism, creating water management schemes etc.

### Components

2.3 The first phase had three main components: (1) National Capacity Building for support for the decentralized management of protected areas; (2) Local Capacity Building for the management of protected areas; (3) Program administration and monitoring.

2.4 **National Capacity Building** (*Estimated cost was US\$1.20 million. Planned GEF financing for this component was US\$1.14 million and actual was US\$1.14 million. Overall actual component costs are not available.*) PAGEN was to provide assistance to the Ministry of Environment to review its legal and institutional framework, in particular the forestry code, in order to help create an enabling environment for community-based protected area management. The component was to finance studies to: analyze the

country's protected area framework; inform major legal changes that were envisioned, including the establishment of a long term funding mechanism and a new institution to centrally direct the decentralized management of protected areas; and provide analysis for the development of tourism in and around the country's protected areas. The component was also to finance conservation related training for forestry staff and NGOs and to help the Government supervise private sector operations, measure conservation results, and establish a national biodiversity database.

**2.5 Local Capacity Building** (*Estimated cost was US\$11.54 million. Planned GEF financing for this component was US\$5.83 million and actual was US\$5.15 million. Actual total component costs are not available*). This component provided assistance for the training of decentralized forest staff, the staff of other Government services, and communities. As part of the first five year phase, PAGEN would put in place and capacitate Inter-Village Associations with the aim of consolidating them in subsequent phases. This component also financed diagnostic studies and protected area management plans, the implementation of which was to take place for the most part in the second and third phases of the program. Technical assistance for the management of protected areas was also planned for the first phase, although this assistance would be gradually phased out as national and community capacity increased and responsibilities were transferred in the long term to the Inter-Village Associations.

**2.6 Program Administration and Monitoring** (*Estimated cost was US\$0.73. Planned GEF was US\$0.53 million and actual GEF was US\$1.21m. Actual total component costs are not available*). PAGEN's administration and monitoring were situated within a small project implementation unit in the Ministry of Environment, in the National Wildlife Service, located in the National Forestry Department. Project monitoring was assigned to a small National Steering Committee that was expected to monitor all project results associated with the national implementation of the overall National Natural Ecosystem Management Program.

### **Project Restructuring**

**2.7** The allocation across project components was adjusted; the decision to create two biological corridors after mid-term represented a major change in the national and local capacity building aims of the project components – a change that, given its effect on the ability of the Bank to properly oversee its safeguards, should have been brought to the attention of country or sector management.

**2.8** This *de facto* restructuring also included the creation of a micro-project program not foreseen in the original design. The project moved US\$325,000 from component 1, from the financing of vehicles and equipment, consultant services, trainings, audits and workshops, to Component 2. In effect, the micro-project program was developed to help compensate the resettled persons in the face of inadequate compensation from the Government. Income generating activities developed as part of the micro-project program included apiculture, aulacodiculture, exploitation of non-timber forest products, etc.

## Main Beneficiaries

2.9 PAGEN's beneficiaries included about 130,000 people from ten different ethnic groups, living around the protected areas targeted by the project: 53,700 people in the Sahel Wildlife Conservation Unit, 50,000 people in the PONASI Unit, 20,000 people in the Comoe Unit, and 10,000 people in the Hauts-Bassins Unit. As indicated in the project appraisal document, these groups were mainly intended to benefit from the project indirectly, through the restoration of ecosystems and wildlife resources. However a marginal increase in the income of the targeted populations was expected from the support of the project for new and/or alternative resource generation activities (such as tourism, safari hunting, pharmacopoeia, and wildlife farming). At design, the project also indicated that an unknown number of pastoralists were expected to benefit from the project.

2.10 Women were specifically targeted in project design. They were to be included in all PAGEN-financed activities from their conception through decision-making stages to their application and use. Women were to be specifically included in literacy programs and training. Attention was supposed to be paid to underlying vulnerabilities and risk-coping activities employed by women, such as exploitation of the forest for domestic needs, picking and gathering of fruits and leaves during the lean period, cultivation in the swamps, and extra-seasonal cultures in the protected areas.

## 3. Safeguards

3.1 PAGEN triggered three safeguard policies: Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01); Natural Habitats (OP 4.04); and Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12). A first draft of the Environmental Assessment dated October 2000 was deemed unsatisfactory by the region's quality assurance team, mainly due to an inadequate social assessment. The project hired an anthropologist with specific knowledge of Burkina Faso and experience with environmental assessments to redraft it. The revised Assessment was not delivered until December 2001.

3.2 The Environmental Assessment identified several risks associated with strengthening the management of wildlife conservation units targeted by the project. It cautioned that there would be an impact on the pastoral areas of replacement (for cattle) particularly in areas already saturated (Parc National de Pô), on the part of the Mouhoun river along the Biosphere Reserve of Mare aux Hippos and on the agro-sylvo-pastoral neighbors (destruction of vegetation cover and increased soil degradation).

3.3 Measures were recommended to decrease the likelihood of agricultural encroachment and pesticide use around the peripheries of the protected areas. In the Hauts Bassins Wildlife Conservation unit in the Biosphere Reserve of *Mare aux Hippos*, the project planted fruit trees to replace cotton production in 52 hectares (belonging to 200 farmers) which also served to create a buffer zone around the reserve. This was a

remedial action to mitigate environmental impacts by creating a buffer zone for the protected area, the width of which is equivalent to 100 meters.

3.4 In regards to the Bank's operational policy on Involuntary Resettlement, project design indicated that "involuntary resettlement was an option excluded by the approach itself." It was triggered because the project aimed to work in and around new and existing protected areas where reforms regarding the collective management of communal resources could end up restricting resources access from certain users. However, as indicated in the appraisal document, the project was designed so that "the limit of existing protected areas would be redefined as necessary to ensure that no involuntary resettlement occurs and that new protected areas will be negotiated with the land users. Rules will be designed by the communities and registered in management plans, and these plans will include a grievance process." (World Bank 2002, p. 2). As such, the project prepared a Framework Process for Involuntary Resettlement. The preparation of a Framework Process was a sufficient instrument chosen during design, in line with the rationale that no new protected areas would be created that required resettlement. Yet project adjustments that were introduced after mid-term in 2005, namely the decision to demarcate two conservation corridors, greatly affected the ability of the Bank and the Government to properly implement OP 4.12 (then OP4.30). A post-midterm decision to physically resettle persons necessitated the drafting of a resettlement mitigation plan, in addition to the process framework. The mitigation plan was drafted in 2005 and put in place in 2007.

3.5 The Indigenous Peoples safeguard (Operational Policy 4.10) was not triggered by this project. However this has more to do with the definition of Indigenous Peoples than the need to identify vulnerable groups that may be affected. Two vulnerable groups that were affected by this project were migrants and pastoralists. Harsh natural conditions (poor and overexploited land, reduced natural resources, and frequent droughts) have caused large population movements for several decades, from the arid Sahelian provinces and the over-crowded Mossi Plateau to more prosperous regions (south-western Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire). In these conditions, a large proportion of Burkinabè migrants have been characterized as "environmental refugees" (Hugo 1996). Concurrently, parts of Burkina Faso's population migrate cyclically for pastoral grazing and watering needs.

## **4. Design and Implementation**

4.1 There are three aspects of PAGEN's original and restructured design that most affected project implementation: the assumption that a long term program for biodiversity conservation would be supported by the Bank and the Government of Burkina Faso which determined the sequencing of activities and investments; the mid-course decision to resettle persons to create biodiversity conservation corridors without sufficient funds for compensation; and the lack of effective coordination between PAGEN and the Community Rural Development Project.

## **The Design of the Project as an Adjustable Program Loan (APL)**

4.2 A stand-alone World Bank executed GEF financed project, the decision to phase the project across a fifteen year period as a World Bank APL was risky. GEF finance would subsequently require the approval of the GEF CEO and IDA funds would have to be allocated to biodiversity conservation (no IDA funds were used for the first phase). It assumed therefore that both the Government and the donors would be as willing in the latter part of the decade to invest in biodiversity conservation as they were in years prior. The project was staged so that the first phase would lay the foundation for future investment. It therefore worked closely with communities to help develop community management plans. The staging of the program as an APL therefore raised the expectations of the beneficiaries who participated heavily in the preparation of management plans and engaged in preliminary related decision-making as part of village level community development committees about the use of their land that buffered the PAs.

4.3 The second phase of PAGEN did not materialize for several reasons. There was a lack of realism during design in terms of garnering long term support, particularly from scarce IDA resources, for protected area management in Burkina Faso. However design could not have assessed the risk that arose more than mid-way through the project due to reforms introduced to the GEF resource allocation process. The GEF launched a new Resource Allocation Framework (RAF) six years into the life of the project that significantly changed the ways countries were allocated resources for biodiversity conservation and climate change. Although the system, now referred to as the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources (STAR), has been somewhat revised, the RAF in effect diminished the resources that would be available to countries with relatively low levels of biodiversity, like Burkina Faso based on a biodiversity index score. IDA resources would subsequently also be harder to come by given the unexpected effects of the food crisis that peaked in Burkina Faso in 2008 and the subsequent fallout (although to a lesser extent) of the financial crisis.

## **The Creation of Biological Corridors within the Ponasi Wildlife Conservation Unit and Safeguard Implementation**

4.4 The decision to create two biodiversity corridors within the Ponasi Wildlife Conservation Unit (the Kabore-Tambi – Nazinga and the Kabore-Tambi-Red Volta valley in Ghana) necessitated the resettlement of some 2,700 persons. This greatly affected the ability of the Bank and the Government of Burkina Faso to properly implement OP 4.12.

4.5 The original project design foresaw that Bank assistance for the enhanced management of Burkina's protected areas would alter the affected population's access to resources, so the project prepared a Framework Process for Involuntary Resettlement in December 2001, prior to project approval. The preparation of a Framework Process was a sufficient option at the time of design, since involuntary resettlement was not

envisioned.<sup>1</sup> However changes were introduced at mid-term that significantly altered the underlying assumption related to protected area management and the issue of resettlement.

4.6 The timing and staging of activities in this project greatly affected its effectiveness. Following the 2005 decision to create the conservation corridors, the project financed a mitigation plan for the projected-affected beneficiaries. However the mitigation plan was not finalized until May 2007 whereas activities related to the demarcation of the corridors and the movement of affected persons began two years prior. The government assumed responsibility for compensation of project- affected persons however compensation provided was significantly lower than that indicated in the draft Mitigation Plan (See Box 1).

4.7 The affected population surrounding the Kaboré Tambi national park managed by the NGO NATURAMA included around 500 cattle breeders that graze in a demarcated silvopastoral zone (Soulougré). Interviews with pastoral groups by the IEG mission in and around Zoundweogo just north of the Park revealed a great deal of frustration on the part of the pastoralists in relation to the lack of rangeland and water access needed to maintain a healthy stock. Effective enforcement of the park system to the south and agricultural expansion to the north of this zone has left the pastoral groups in a vulnerable position. Although the reserve features a rangeland, water points, and cattle tracks, the Bank's and other donor projects have changed the traditional rotational grazing patterns of the group.

4.8 Similarly, many of the resettled persons affected by this project were migrants that were previously apportioned agricultural land in the areas targeted for conservation. Referred to as "squatters" in the Bank project documentation, this vulnerable group was negatively affected by the project. In Burkina Faso, the customary land system is based on the collective ownership of land, which is exercised by a land custodian who has inherited this title by virtue of being the closest descendant of the first settler of the village. As land custodian, he is authorized to distribute lands based on a system of rites and in accordance to needs. Migrants are awarded land use, but only provisionally and hence must contend with a high level of land and livelihood instability. However, according to customary law, land cannot be refused to an applicant – except in rare cases. Although the project at design was situated clearly within the existing village level structures and supported customary practice, the resettlement that occurred after mid-term was not defined or carried out in customary terms. Land allocation is a complex customary practice in Burkina Faso. Project teams should work to assure that the Bank's safeguards are being adequately but also appropriately and sensitively applied.

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1. "The limit of existing protected areas will be defined as necessary to ensure that no involuntary resettlement occurs and new protected areas will be negotiated with the land users." (Environmental and Social data Sheet August, 2001).

**Box I: Resettlement of Project Affected Persons in the PONASI Wildlife Conservation Unit**

In the WCU PONASI, the demarcation of the two corridors required the resettlement of 52 villages. The mitigation plan included the following measures:

- obtain arable lands for PAPs
- support agricultural inputs (fertilizer for the first year, agricultural equipment)
- Strengthening PAPs capacity in new farming techniques
- Support for socio-economic infrastructure
- Support the performance of customary rites relating to the cession of the corridors area (prior to any investment).

As identified by the Environmental Impact Study commissioned by the project towards project end, resettlement of the villages located in the WCU Ponasi was not in compliance with the Bank's safeguards for the following reasons:

- The obtained lands were less fertile than those in the corridors which have not yet been affected by agricultural pressure.
- While the compensation allowed for an initial clearing of the newly allocated, less fertile land, compensation was not provided for the loss of productivity that occurred between the resettlement and reestablishment of the new farms;
- Access to schools and health facilities were altered;
- Although additional watering points were supplied, the amount of water required as an input into the new land provided exceeded the water supply provided;
- Some vulnerable groups, such as widows, were adversely affected since PAPs were expected to build new residences.



## Relation with the Community Based Rural Development Project

4.9 The CBRD project was considered the baseline program for the GEF grant since, as described in PAGEN's PAD, it (a) implemented the long term vision of the Government for decentralized rural development and (b) provided the necessary conditions for successful implementation of PAGEN by ensuring that the primary needs of communities adjacent to protected areas would be fulfilled and that their planning and organizational capacity would be improved. It was envisioned that village level investments provided through CBRD's micro-grant program would include natural resource as well as socio-economic investments, mainly through rural infrastructure and services. Natural resource management micro-projects would include *inter alia* tree-planting, livestock production, fisheries, and micro-irrigation while other investments would include support for schooling and adult literacy, health and HIV/AIDS provision, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure etc. To ensure that CBRD targeted villages in the protected area peripheries, PAGEN envisioned that agreements would be signed between the Ministries in charge of each operation.

4.10 While an official Memorandum of Understanding was drawn up and signed between the two projects, the cooperation envisioned between the underlying investment and the GEF grant did not fully materialize. Timing was an issue. CBRD was designed prior to PAGEN and its beneficiaries had already been targeted. Although there was some geographical overlap between the two projects, the program did not retrofit its design or adjust parts of its micro-program to accommodate the needs of PAGEN's beneficiaries, despite the MOU. This review found some evidence of cooperation between the two projects around the river Volta in the Kabore park where some support was lent to the displaced persons to intensify agriculture around a branch of the river (since the plots that were previously being occupied were prohibited), but this cooperation was limited. There were no rural development micro-projects financed by CBRD implemented in the provinces peripheral to the Sahel wildlife corridor supported by PAGEN.

4.11 As recognized by early quality assurance discussions, effective linkages between the two programs would rely on the effective coordination of the activities of the two Bank projects during implementation. This need was especially acute after mid-term, when the decision was taken to resettle persons living in and around the newly demarcated corridors. However the first Phase of the CBRD project was winding down at this juncture and the second phase was designed to work at the municipal, not the village level.

## 5. Ratings

### RELEVANCE

5.1 PAGEN's objective is **substantially** relevant, however less so today given the effects of the food crisis in West Africa. The relevance of project design is rated **Modest**.

5.2 Relevance of objectives. PAGEN's first phase objective is rated **Substantially** relevant. The project objective was in line with the country's 2000 Country Assistance Strategy objective of strengthening the country's decentralized rural development strategy and its 2000 Poverty Reduction Strategy objective that identified sustainable management of natural resources as one of the major pillars for combating poverty. PAGEN was designed to reinforce the overarching aims of the Community Based Rural Development project. The Country Assistance Strategy lists PAGEN as a FY01 APL as a project that will contribute to rural development "to increase productivity of rural assets (labor and land) through the conservation and renewal of natural resources..." The objective was in also line with the government's 2000 Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. The government viewed PAGEN as one instrument that could help implement its National Natural Ecosystem Management program, lodged under the national rural development program.

5.3 Today however PAGEN's objective is viewed by parts of the government as less relevant than at design due to the fallout from the food crisis (and to a lesser extent the financial crises). The food crisis in 2008, for example, prompted violent protests in the capital of Burkina Faso. In response, the Government moved its IDA resources that were in part targeted for the second phase of PAGEN towards the development of the Agricultural Productivity and Food Security Project (approved in November 2009). The new food security project, financed from IDA at a level of US\$40m does not include GEF funds but provides some continuity by specifically targeting the communities living around the protected areas targeted by PAGEN. In the spirit of PAGEN, the project will also support income generating activities, particularly through the promotion of non-timber forest products. However the exact percent allocation of resources from the food security project that will be extended to these communities has not been articulated in project documentation or in interviews conducted over the course of the PPAR mission.

5.4 **Relevance of design.** The relevance of project design is rated **Modest**. There are aspects of PAGEN's design that were well grounded in the country's socio-cultural context and needs and these are worth noting. It worked at the right level. The focus on village and inter-village capacity building for protected area management was in line with the country's decentralized rural development process underway, supported heavily by the World Bank's Community Based Rural Development project. The project also assessed where it was most needed. PAGEN sought to complement the ongoing ecosystem management work underway by targeting four wildlife conservation units that were not being assisted by other donors active in the sector, such as the AfdB, the EU, and the ADB. Interviews with the Ministry of Environment revealed that the project was lodged within a government-led steering committee that would jointly, along with other donors, monitor and report on biodiversity indicators across all assisted protected area sites.

5.5 The design of the project as a fifteen year program was also realistic in so far as the project recognized that "capacity building and ecological restoration require many years." However the project was prepared in a manner that over-relied on subsequent phases of support – from the GEF (which would require GEF CEO approval) and IDA – to implement the studies, management plans, and sector strategies that it formulated in its first phase. The second and third phase were supposed to build on and consolidate the

achievements of the first phase, focusing in particular on developing income-generating activities and financial mechanisms that would guarantee financial sustainability of the activities. This phased approach positioned activities that would ensure enhanced livelihoods and the sustainability of the protected areas system towards the end of the APL. PAGEN also over-relied on the Community Development Project to help fund micro-projects geared towards enhanced natural resource management in the PAGEN target areas.

5.6 Project design was also constrained by a weak M&E framework. The results chain was not designed to measure or monitor the project's contribution to rural development or enhance livelihoods. The framework lacked methods for assessing capacity development. Project design also was challenged by a lack of consistency between the indicators presented in the PAD, Grant Agreement, and the indicators initially chosen to be tracked during implementation supervision missions

### **EFFICACY**

5.7 Efficacy is rated **Substantial**. This is a GEF financed environment project executed by the World Bank. The PAD therefore articulated both a Global Environment Objective (GEO) and a project Development Objective (DO). As discussed in previous sections, the PAD laid out a set of objectives designed to be achieved across the projected three phases outlined in the 15 year APL. Phase One - Reverse biodiversity trends in priority protected areas; Phase Two - Substantially improve biodiversity in priority protected areas; and Phase Three - Secure biodiversity in priority protected areas. This is an assessment of the effectiveness of the first phase.

5.8 The PAD indicated that "Success in achieving outcomes set by the Global and Project Development Objectives [would] be verified by (1) reduction of agricultural encroachment in protected areas (as measured by remote sensing techniques) and (2) improvement of a set of bioindicators (indicators of mammals in terrestrial areas and birds in wetlands) whose data would be collected with technical (aerial surveys) and participatory (line transects) ecological monitoring." Project supervision monitored the implementation of two indicators: (1) the percentage of the area of the protected areas with agricultural encroachment and (2) the percentage improvement of bioindicators (indicators of mammals in terrestrial areas and birds in wetlands).

5.9 Designed more than a decade ago, the GEF financed PAGEN project developed biodiversity related indicators that were able to be monitored by the participating communities and that could allow for a tabulation and comparison of biodiversity related outcomes across the nine protected areas. Standardized indicators to measure the outcomes of World Bank supported biodiversity conservation projects have evolved considerably since then. If the PAGEN project was designed today, it would be expected to utilize the Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) – a tool developed by the WWF and rolled out by the GEF that allows for project level as well as portfolio level tracking of the management capacity of protected areas, although it too has its weaknesses. Nevertheless, PAGEN did not establish its baselines for its two main bio-indicators until 2004, with the assistance of parallel Danish finance.

**5.10 Reduction of agricultural encroachment in protected areas.** Supervision missions monitored this indicator through remote sensing by measuring the change in the percentage of cultivated area within the boundaries of the protected areas. However proper surveillance did not begin until 2005. Prior to that, monitoring was mainly conducted through field observations. The indicator did not take into consideration temporary incursions by livestock.

5.11 Agricultural encroachment decreased across all targeted protected areas: there was no crop cultivation within the boundaries of protected areas at the end of the project in all the Wildlife Conservation Units except for the Sahel Unit, where cultivation dropped from 20 to 13 percent during the course of the project. However, there is increasing human pressure around the WCUs. At project end, the percentage of cultivated land in the areas surrounding the protected areas had increased from 15 to 49 percent, from 43 to 93 percent, and from 58 to 77 percent in the Comoé-Léraba, Boulon-Kouflandé, and in the biosphere Mare aux Hippopotames, respectively, over the life of the project.<sup>2</sup> With the termination of the APL at the end of the first phase, no sustainable mechanisms were left in place to involve peripheral communities in the management of the protected areas and to ensure an adequate flow of benefits that could ensure their sustainable management in the long run.

**5.12 Improvement of a set of bioindicators (indicators of mammals in terrestrial areas and birds in wetlands).** By project end, there was an increase in the number of animals in the WCUs targeted by the project: the chosen bio-indicator (*l'indice kilométrique d'abondance des populations des mammifères - IKA*) increased for almost all species and in all the WCUs. Bio-indicators improved due to several project interventions. The project established new protected areas and biological corridors, including six new protected areas that were negotiated and created in the Sahel (Nassoumbou, Séno-Mago, Béli, Darkoye, Oursi Nord and Oursi Sud, for a total area of 525,854 ha); the area of the Boulon-Kouflandé Forest was increased (from 42,000 to 56,822ha), and two biological corridors were created within the PONASI WCU (4,500 and 33,000 ha respectively). It also helped to formulate an Anti-Poaching Strategy, financed the training of 166 forest agents throughout the country and involved local communities in surveillance activities.

5.13 PAGEN achieved its first phase objective by also supporting the Government in creating the enabling environment for community-based protected area management. Although by project end the Forestry Code had not been fully adopted and launched, the project supported the formulation of forest related decrees, and helped to raise awareness about the code by disseminating it and by organizing a series of awareness raising workshops. The project also supported the formulation of a National Program for the Management of Wildlife and Protected Areas (*Programme National de Gestion de la Faune et des Aires Protégées*) and provided assistance in drafting its associated Action Plan.

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2. In its comments to this PPAR (see Annex C) the Government indicates that occupancy percentages are not as high as pointed out in the ICR and the IEG PPAR, however the figures quoted in the ICR were confirmed during the IEG PPAR mission and no revised figures were made available to IEG.

5.14 Site visits conducted for this review confirmed the existence of village-level management plans that had been supported by this and other donor programs. However, none of these plans had been financed, and in some villages, due to poor staging, plans had not been fully prepared until the very end of the project. In other villages visited, the mission discovered the existence of multiple plans, financed for the most part by Dutch aid prior to and during the project period. The IEG mission also verified that jobs had been supported through the project, although these occupations were no longer being supported after the project closed. The mission also learned that like activities were supported by the International NGO TreeAid, and were predominantly carried out in the Comoe Leraba.

5.15 Women were specifically targeted in project design: however interviews at the village level revealed that while women were included in traditional activities such as the collection of non-timber forest products and products for medicinal use, the women were not included in decision making concerning the management of the protected areas or their use.

## **EFFICIENCY**

5.16 Efficiency is rated **Modest**.

5.17 *Incremental Cost Criteria for GEF Projects.* The project conducted an incremental analysis of the costs of providing the global public environmental goods financed through the GEF. The assessment estimated that incremental costs of US\$7.5 million would be required to deliver the GEF alternative to the baseline scenario, calculated at US\$5.96 million. Baseline costs (costs not associated with the production of global environmental public goods were derived from the Bank's and other donors' rural portfolio of projects under implementation in and around the PAGEN project sites. These underlying costs included an expected US\$2.53 million contribution from CBRD financed by IDA, a US\$1.0 million contribution from rural development projects financed by the Netherlands and the African Development Bank, Government contributions equivalent to US\$1.68 million, direct community contributions of US\$590,000 and a small amount of finance from NGOs in the order of US\$60,000.

5.18 All of the GEF finance was disbursed. Yet the World Bank's CBRD contributions fell short by more than US\$1million. This necessitated the transfer of some of the GEF funds to a micro-project program – a program that for the most part funds the provision of local goods – whereas GEF finance is designed to finance only the incremental costs of providing global environmental public goods. Financing for global environmental benefits is relatively scarce in the face of global needs – in this the conservation of biodiversity in the Sahel and other woodlands of Burkina Faso. The use of GEF funds to finance a micro-project program represents an inefficient use of funds since there were several pieces of underlying finance that the GEF grant was built upon that should have been tapped for this purpose, especially the CBRD purpose since it was considered the baseline project.

5.19 Nevertheless, the project reported income gains from the implementation of these micro-projects. According to the ICR and interviews with the NGO Naturama conducted during the IEG mission, support to revenue generating activities resulted in the creation

of 283 jobs between 2003-2007. These activities included production of charcoal, safari hunting, honey production, exploitation of non-timber forest products, exploitation of halieutic resources, production of karite butter, production of soap, production of soubala, and maintenance jobs. Documentation provides total revenues generated over the project period per category, but there is no indication in the project documentation as to how many people benefitted directly from the projects nor who benefitted (an important point given the stratification of Burkinabe society and village life). IEG interviews in the field found that many of these activities had ended by the time the IEG mission took place.

5.20 *Cost Effectiveness.* Due to the depreciation of the dollar, the project lost about one fifth of its value. However, instead of consolidating the project's activities to achieve the aims it set out at appraisal, the scope of the project was expanded by creating two elephant migration corridors, for which a Resettlement Framework could not be finalized or validated, nor would there be adequate compensation for the resettled persons.

5.21 PAGEN was designed as an APL and as such left activities that would support the financial sustainability of the systems that were being put in place in the first phase until the end. These activities, such as development of tourism or a sustainable financial mechanism for the protected area system were therefore left undeveloped. The project did not envision being able to obtain a rate of return for at least ten years into project implementation and without continuation of the APL, the types of return envisioned are unlikely to materialize. The envisioned returns varied based on locale. In Comoe-Lerabe, a business plan drawn up for the site projected that by 2006, the revenues from utilization of wildlife, tourism, and valorization of other savannah products would just balance the costs of maintaining infrastructure and carrying out field activities. In the Sahel, the project projected it would be likely to take all three phases of the APL and that financial returns would depend primarily on international tourism, noting that although thousands of tourists and waterfowl hunters already visit the area, little of the income is captured locally. For other protected areas that do not prove financially viable, the project planned to help establish a long-term financial mechanism. This was designed to be established in the third phase.

## **OVERALL OUTCOME**

5.22 The overall outcome of the project is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**. A substantially relevant project whose objectives were in line with the country's biodiversity related frameworks and poverty alleviation strategies, the project lost some of its support towards completion due to domestic challenges posed by the food and to a lesser extent the financial crisis. The project was designed in a relevant manner in line with the country's rural decentralization efforts, socio-cultural context, and relative capacities. However decisions taken after mid-term lessened the relevance of project design since the decision strayed from the original capacity development aims of the project towards alternative activities such as the creation of migration corridors. This decision was taken late in the project cycle, in the face of dollar depreciation, resulting in the Bank's inability to assure proper mitigation of its social safeguards. Yet the project achieved its objective of reversing biodiversity trends, by helping to strengthen the capacity of the village and inter-village committees to promote enhanced natural resource

management and community management of the protected areas. The project fully achieved results against the two main bio-indicators utilized in this project. The project successfully reduced agricultural encroachment and increased biodiversity in all areas in which it worked. There is however a high risk that these outcomes will not be sustained.

## **Bank Performance**

5.23 Bank performance is rated **Moderately Unsatisfactory**. The Moderately Unsatisfactory rating is based on Moderately Satisfactory quality at entry but Moderately Unsatisfactory supervision. The serious lack of attention to resettlement issues and the resulting safeguards violation during supervision calls for the supervision rating to outweigh the MS quality of entry rating, leading to an overall MU rating for Bank performance.

### **QUALITY AT ENTRY**

5.24 Quality at entry was **Moderately Satisfactory**. The scientific and technical soundness of the project was confirmed at appraisal by the Scientific and Technical Committee of the GEF. Its review found that lessons for the region (and for the Sahel in particular) could be gleaned from the project's proposed community-based approaches to conservation and natural resource management since in Africa, this approach had at the time been mainly applied in Southern and Central Africa. Although the project took twice as long to prepare as planned (36 months), its design was firmly rooted in Burkinabe customs and the country's decentralization strategy. In its 2000 Biodiversity Action Plan, the government defined its long-term vision and commitment to incorporate protected area management in rural development. PAGEN was designed to help achieve this aim. However the instrument chosen resulted in the shift of critically needed investments towards later phases of the program that would never materialize. This created expectations related to the long-term commitment beneficiaries felt had been put in place by the project to fund the investments that were articulated in their community development management plans.

### **QUALITY OF SUPERVISION**

5.25 Quality of supervision is rated **Moderately Unsatisfactory**. IEG recognizes the day-do-day supervision carried out by the project team based in Ouagadougou that was instrumental in helping to achieve results on the ground. The overall project outcome rating is Moderately Satisfactory due in part to the performance of the field based team, its good relationship with the Government, implementing agencies, and the local authorities.

5.26 However, the quality of Supervision is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory since while the Bank conducted an average of two supervision missions per year (11 missions total), it neglected to ensure compliance with safeguards, in particular on resettlement. The realism of supervision ratings regarding the project's social safeguards was skewed. Every Implementation Supervision Report submitted for this project assigned a Satisfactory rating with regards to social safeguard compliance, except for the last mission, which downgraded compliance with specific reference to the issue of involuntary resettlement to Moderately Satisfactory.

5.27 Capacity issues related to project implementation as well as the capacity to implement the Environmental and Social Mitigation Plan were not raised until February 2004. It should be noted that following this recognition of a capacity problem, the WBG supervision team engaged the support of the Direction Generale de l'Environnement (specifically the direction des evaluations environnementales) and organized a training workshop on July 2004 on safeguards with a focus on resettlement that included project staff, Direction Générale de l'Environnement staff, UCF, Naturama and members of the inter-village associations. However, this did not result in compliance.

## **Borrower Performance**

5.28 Borrower Performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

### **GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE**

5.29 Government performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**. The government, led by the Ministry of Environment and Water, supported the implementation of a number of innovative institutional and legal measures, which enabled the status of protected areas to be changed so that a local community's institution, in this case the inter-village protected area management association, could become the concessionaire of the area. They also supported a range of parallel measures that empowered communities to assume the responsibility for a range of development activities in the area.

5.30 The government support equaled 25-30 percent of the actual GEF contribution. An additional allocation was provided by the Government in 2007 to partially compensate the financial loss due to the depreciation of the dollar. Yet while the Government also took on the responsibility of compensating resettled communities, compensation fell short of standards set by the World Bank's operational policy. The biological corridors created and demarcated with project assistance should not have been put in place without the means to properly compensate the resettled beneficiaries.

### **IMPLEMENTING AGENCY PERFORMANCE**

5.31 The performance of the implementing agencies is rated **Satisfactory**. During the course of the project, the institutional framework for the implementation of the project changed. The Ministry of Environment and Hydraulic – the agency originally responsible for the implementation of the project – was restructured and became the Ministry of the Environment and Quality of Life (MECV). The Forestry Department where the PCU was situated was split into two directorates: the General Directorate of Nature Conservation and the National Directorate of Water and Forests (a paramilitary branch). The restructuring did not cause major delays to the project. High turnover of staff did not affect procurement or financial management which was rated satisfactory throughout the project. Members of the PCU with whom this review worked during the IEG mission displayed an excellent awareness of the project and had good working relations with the project beneficiaries visited, in despite of the resettlement issues discussed herein.



## Monitoring and Evaluation

5.32 Monitoring and Evaluation design, implementation, and utilization are rated **Modest**.

### M&E DESIGN

5.33 M&E design is rated **Modest**. Without the benefit of a specific and measurable objective, the M&E system for the project relied on two outcome indicators chosen during implementation that were deemed most useful in tracking progress towards the development and global environmental objective. The design of the initial system suffered from a lack of consistency between the indicators presented in the PAD, Grant Agreement, and the indicators initially chosen to be tracked during implementation supervision missions. The PAD lists sixteen output indicators in the main text and fourteen in the Annex, only eight of which are consistent with one another. However this was in part due to the staging of the program across a fifteen year period across a fifteen year period where separate indicators would be used during separate stages.

### M&E IMPLEMENTATION

5.34 Implementation of the M&E system is rated **modest**. Baseline data were not collected for the project until late 2004, with the assistance of parallel finance provided by DANIDA. Despite the fact the government had committed to supporting surveillance in the protected areas targeted by the project, equipment for conducting remote sensing was only procured mid-way through the project and training had to be conducted thereafter. Therefore in the early part of the project, monitoring was mainly conducted through field observations. One aerial survey was conducted in 2005; however the project lacked resources to conduct the follow-up survey planned for project end.

5.35 Other results, namely job creation through the small grants program occurred but were not systematically monitored or reported though the supervision missions (however they were provided by the government's completion report).

5.36 One important omission of the project's M&E system is the lack of indicators developed to measure the bulk of the project's component activities – namely capacity building. Designed with an ambiguous objective, the project's M&E system should have been designed with output and outcome indicators to also measure and report on the enhanced capacity of the Ministry of Environment, the decentralized forest staff, and the inter-village committees to more effectively manage the protected areas. The M&E system as it was designed does not include indicators that establish causal links between the capacity strengthening aims of the project and the outcomes reported.

### USE OF M&E DATA

5.37 M&E Utilization is rated **Negligible**. The project's M&E systems were not used to enhance project implementation. There is very little learning that has resulted from the implementation of this system - that only tracked two physical indicators – that can inform project design about community based natural resource management in like environments. Likewise, effective development and implementation of the M&E system could have paved the way for a more robust readiness strategy in relation to efforts to

reduce deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). Burkina Faso has been chosen as one of five countries that will be financed during the first round of the Forest Investment Program.

## **Risk to Development Outcome**

5.38 Risk to development outcome is **High**. The premature end of the planned APL has resulted in a high risk to the sustainability of the activities carried out in the first phase of this project. For example, PAGEN financed the operating costs of the National Forestry Department, the implementing agency of PAGEN. PAGEN financed conservation awareness activities geared at improving conservation-oriented behavior of National Forestry Department Staff, staff of the Wildlife Conservation Units, concessionaires, and guides. It financed vehicles, the construction of park infrastructure, and other operating costs to support an anti-poaching unit. The drop in poaching activities reported by the project can be directly linked to the support provided by the project. Interviews with the Forest Staff conducted for this review discussed the fact that although the project helped put in place an Anti-Poaching National Strategy, there is an inadequate amount of recurrent finance available to sustain the level of surveillance that was conducted during the life of the project.

5.39 This is complicated by the fact that the project was responsible for creating 578,176 ha of newly protected areas. These newly demarcated areas include the two new biological/migration corridors. While the corridors were demarcated and persons were resettled by the end of Phase I, interviews with environment and forest staff and the concessionaire, NATURAMA, indicated that the elephant population will be extremely vulnerable post-project since the demarcated area was not equipped with proper surveillance infrastructure, tourism was not developed, and resources for anti-poaching are not available at the level at which they were available through the project. Sustainable financing mechanisms were to be developed for the protected area system under subsequent phases. In fact, PAGEN supported roughly ten studies that were commissioned during the first phase to inform the second phase on management and sustainable financing, tourism development, partnership with the private sector, and livelihoods development.

5.40 A follow-on project financed by IDA, the *Agricultural Productivity and Food Security* project that has recently been prepared will target the communities living around the Protected Areas targeted by PAGEN. However the exact percentage of support that will reach these communities has not been articulated in project documentation.

## **6. Conclusion and Lessons**

6.1 This PPAR was conducted as an input into IEG's *Review of the World Bank's Safeguard Policies*, and as such, focuses heavily on the conclusions that can be drawn

and the lessons that can be learned from the implementation of the Bank's safeguards policies in GEF financed biodiversity conservation projects, in this case, in West Africa.

- **Protected area projects supported by the World Bank need to ensure that other means of finance, apart from the GEF, are woven into the project design in case contingency resources are needed to ensure that negative impacts on human livelihoods are mitigated.** Biodiversity conservation projects that seek to enlarge or create protected areas or conservation corridors always involve a change in access by rural residents to natural resources and sometime involve physical resettlement. Proper valuation of livelihoods and sufficient project costing for the restoration of these livelihoods are essential and should be firmly figured into project design. GEF stand-alone projects are less equipped to finance the costs of restoring livelihoods since GEF is an incremental financing instrument designed to focus on the provision of global environmental benefits.
- **The Bank's Safeguard on Indigenous Peoples is not comprehensive enough to cover vulnerable groups that may be affected by a project.** Biodiversity conservation projects that limit access to resources, including water and grazing rights of nomadic groups and herders, need to highlight the particular needs of these groups in the social assessment and work with the respective client governments to formulate appropriate mitigation strategies. The Bank's resettlement policies should be applied on a contextual basis so that, where appropriate, seasonal and climatic migration is taken into account in figuring the number of project affected persons.
- Projects with small grants programs typically indicate that since the activities will be chosen downstream, environmental management plans will need to be designed at the time when activities are selected, and that the management plans must be designed in consultation with the beneficiaries. The project level Environment Management Plan is often modeled as a framework process that provides guidelines on how to develop EMPs at the site or activity level. Guidelines include information concerning Bank standards on participation and inclusion, conflict resolution, monitoring and evaluation. However, for this system to be effectively implemented, **adequate and upfront assessment is needed of EIA capacity at the village and inter-village level, including both capacity for assessment and capacity to mitigate harm (technical and financial capacity).**



## Annex A. Basic Data Sheet

### Partnership for Natural Ecosystem Management Project

#### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>
Total project costs	13.80	13.20
Loan/Grant amount	7.50	7.50
Cofinancing	4.98	3.88

#### Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Appraisal	02/15/2000	01/15/2002
Negotiations	08/15/2000	01/25/2002
Board Approval	10/17/2000	05/21/2002
Signing	-	07/10/2002
Effectiveness	-	04/29/2003
Project Completion	12/31/2007	12/31/2007

#### Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Lending</b>		
FY99		13.17
FY00	19	58.97
FY01	23	78.33
FY02	18	72.05
FY03	2	2.88
	<b>Total:</b>	<b>225.34</b>
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>		
FY03	16	59.01
FY04	13	32.94
FY05	26	58.58
FY06	25	40.94
FY07	21	42.69
FY08	25	81.93
	<b>Total:</b>	<b>308.52</b>

**Mission Data**

<i>Names</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Responsibility/ Speciality</i>
<b>Lending</b>			
Jean-Michel Pavy	Sr. Environmental Specialist	AFTEN	Task Manager
Ibrahim Nebie	Agricultural Services Specialist	AFTEN	
Emmanuel Nikiema	Natural Resources Mgmt. Specialist	AFTAR	
Luc Lecuit	Evaluation Specialist		
Jerome Gauthier	Livestock & Local Dvt. Specialist		
Mohammed Bekhechi	Environmental Lawyer		
Korka Diallo	Disbursement Specialist		
Mamadou Yaro	Financial Management Analyst		
Celestin Bado	Sr. Operations Officer	AFTPR	
Amadou Tidiane Toure	Procurement Officer	AFTPC	
Jane Hopkins	Economist		
Pascale Dubois	Country Lawyer		
Luc Lapointe	Procurement Officer		
Edith Mwemba	Lawyer		
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>			
Ibrahim Nebie	Sr. Ag. Extension Specialist	AFTAR	Task Manager
Paola Agostini	Sr. Economist	AFTEN	Economist
Christophe Crepin	Lead Environment Specialist	AFTEN	GEF focal point
Emmanuel Y. Nikiema	Sr. Natural Resources Mgmt Sp.	AFTEN	
Matteo Marchisio	Consultant	AFTEN	ICR Author
William Dakpo	Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	Procurement
Mamadou Yaro	Sr. Financial Management Sp.	AFTFM	Financial Mgmt.
Marwane Diallo	Consultant	AFTFM	Financial Mgmt.
Gwladys Isabelle Kinda	Team Assistant	AFMBF	Supp. Support
Marie-Jeane Ndiaye	Program Assistant	AFTS4	Supp. Support
Virginie Vaselopoulos	Program Assistant	AFTEN	Su. Support
Francis Lauginie	Consultant	AFTEN	
Oumar Ouattara	Consultant	WBIHD	
Dirk Nicolaas Prevoo	Senior Operations Officer	AFTEN	
Abdoul-Wahab Seyni	Social Development Spec.	AFTCS	
Bassega Celestin Zinkone	Consultant	AFMBF	

## Annex B. List of Persons Met

NAME	Affiliation	General Title and Title in Relation to Project	Contact Information Email/Phone/Fax
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Pierre Kafando	OFINAP / PAGEN		pierre_kafando@yahoo.fr (00226) 70 22 49 23
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Francois Sia		Villager	
Issoufou Ouédraogo		Villager	
Seydou Sankara		Villager	
Baba Zerbo		Villager	
Salamata Adouabou		Villager	
Moussa Koudibakida		Villager	



## Annex C. Borrower Comments

### Rapport de l'évaluation indépendante du projet de Partenariat pour l'Amélioration de la Gestion des Ecosystèmes Naturels (PAGEN)

#### Commentaires du Gouvernement du Burkina Faso

#### Notations (Principal Ratings)

#### Projet de Partenariat pour l'Amélioration de la Gestion des Ecosystèmes Naturels (Partnership for Natural Ecosystem Management (P052400))

Nous proposons une appréciation du Gouvernement du Burkina Faso en dernière colonne (voir tableau ci-dessous)

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>	<i>Govt of BF Assessment</i>
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Significant	High	High	Significant
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory

\* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEGWB product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

Govt of BF Assessment: Evaluation du Gouvernement du Burkina Faso

Le résumé (Summary) est à reprendre en fonction des commentaires du Gouvernement du Burkina Faso

#### Observations d'ordre général

Le rapport de l'évaluation indépendante a fait un effort considérable en passant en revue les résultats atteints par le projet mais a également abordé des questions clés quand à la durabilité de ces acquis pour un projet initialement programmé pour 15 ans mais qui s'est brusquement arrêté au bout de 5 ans. Le rapport a également mis l'accent sur les questions de compensation des populations déplacées dans le cadre de la mise en place des corridors au Parc National Kaboré Tambi (PNKT) en insistant sur le non respect des procédures de la Banque Mondiale en matière de mise en œuvre du plan de gestion environnementale et sociale (PGES). Les efforts consentis par le Gouvernement du Burkina Faso ainsi que l'implication des populations autochtones dans la mise en œuvre des mesures de sauvegarde environnementale et sociale ont été sommairement évoquées. Certains résultats suffisamment positifs du projet n'ont pas été soulignés dans le rapport, tel que les taux atteints au niveau des indicateurs de performance.

### **Restructuration du projet**

**2.7.** La restructuration du projet, intervenue à la faveur de la revue à mi-parcours, réalisée conjointement par la Banque Mondiale et le Gouvernement du Burkina Faso, était une nécessité pour mieux recadrer les activités en vue de réaliser des résultats performants. C'est ainsi qu'il a été décidé le financement de microprojets au profit des populations et la création des deux corridors.

### **2.8. Microprojets**

Le développement de microprojets n'a pas seulement concerné les populations qui devaient quitter l'emprise des corridors comme l'indique le rapport de l'évaluation indépendant, mais l'ensemble des populations autour des 5 aires d'interventions du projet. Ces activités rémunératrices de revenus ont été demandées par les populations riveraines et le gouvernement était tenu de les appuyer pour leur développement. Ainsi, des activités d'apiculture, d'aulacodiculture, d'exploitation de produits forestiers non ligneux, de plantation de vergers, de pêche (équipement en matériel de pêche), et autres ont été développées. Cet aspect a été positif pour le projet et de nos jours continuent de développer ces activités elles-mêmes.

## **7. Mesures de sauvegarde environnementale et sociale (Safeguards)**

### **3.3.** La création d'un verger écologique autour de la Réserve de biosphère de la Mare aux Hippopotames

La réalisation de ce verger écologique (fruitier) a été négociée avec tous les producteurs qui ont identifié les types de microprojets qu'ils veulent mettre en œuvre en guise de compensation. L'administration locale (préfectures et communes rurales riveraines de la réserve) et l'AGEREF de la Forêt Classée de la Réserve de Biosphère de la Mare aux Hippopotames ont tous participé à tout le processus de négociations. C'est ainsi que le projet PAGEN a financièrement accompagnés ces populations (PAPs) pour l'acquisition des plants fruitiers pour un montant de 20 millions de francs CFA en deux années. Contrairement au rapport d'évaluation indépendante qui stipule que les populations dont les champs auparavant contigus à la forêt classée ont été déplacées sans dédommagement, il convient de noter que ces populations ont doublement bénéficié du PAGEN. En effet, elles continuent de cultiver le coton sur les autres portions des terroirs, les cultures basses et le maïs sur les 52 hectares (au lieu de 520 ha indiqué dans le document de l'évaluation indépendante). Il convient de noter que la largeur de la bande des vergers ne couvre que 100 mètres. Mieux, cette situation évite les conflits perpétuels avec le service des Eaux et Forêts pour l'occupation illégale de la zone tampon de la forêt classée. La mise en place des vergers écologiques est un aspect positif pour le gouvernement et cela se ressent de nos jours au regard des relations de bonne collaboration entre le service forestier et les populations (à travers leur AGEREF) qui continuent d'organiser ensemble les opérations de surveillance, l'exploitation des produits forestiers non ligneux et la pêche. Les communautés autour de la Réserve de la Biosphère se sentent aujourd'hui suffisamment co-propriétaires et co-gestionnaires de cette forêt. Le gouvernement ne peut qualifier ce cas spécifique de « déplacement involontaire des populations » mais pense plutôt qu'il s'agit d'une opération qui rentre dans le cadre de l'aménagement du territoire au bénéfice de toutes les parties concernées, étant donné que ces populations restent toujours sur les mêmes terres.

### **3.4. Corridors**

La mise en place des deux corridors répond à la recommandation de la revue à mi-parcours en 2005. Ainsi, les deux parties, Banque Mondiale et Gouvernement du Burkina Faso ont convenu de la mise en place des deux corridors du PNKT dans la vision, non seulement de favoriser la migration des animaux sauvages, notamment les éléphants, de préserver la biodiversité (objectif primordial du projet PAGEN) mais également de contribuer à la réalisation du protocole de gestion des ressources naturelles partagées entre le Ghana et le Burkina Faso.

Le processus de la mise en place des corridors a été très participatif. Elle ainsi vu l'engagement des autorités locales, des élus locaux, des administrations communales (communes de Guiaro, Ziou, Tiébélé, Gon-Boussougou, Zoaga, Zabré, Pò), de tous les services techniques concernés, des autorités coutumières (chefs de villages et chefs de terres) et des personnes affectées par le projet (PAPs). Le tracé des deux corridors a été faite avec toutes les parties prenantes. Le Gouvernement a déployé des efforts financiers supplémentaires pour les compensations qui ont été établies de manière consensuelles entre le projet (l'administration publique), les personnes concernées et les autorités coutumières. Aucune personne installée dans les corridors n'a été déplacée de force. La réinstallation des PAPs a été négociée avec les propriétaires terriens locaux qui leur ont distribué gratuitement des terres d'habitations et de cultures sans **contrainte aucune**.

Il est constaté que les conditions de la Banque n'ont pas été toutes respectées en ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre du plan de gestion environnementale et sociale. Cela est essentiellement lié au manque de ressources financières dû à la chute du dollar, à la non-poursuite de la seconde phase du PAGEN qui devait permettre de consolider davantage les acquis de la première phase. Cependant, comme souligné plus haut, le Gouvernement du Burkina Faso qui porte un intérêt particulier à la réalisation de ces deux corridors, première expérience écologique dans la sous région ouest Africaine, a financièrement contribué à leur réalisation. Les populations locales ont, quant à elles ont accepté distribuer des terres aux PAPs. Les infrastructures sociales mises à la disposition des PAPs et des populations locales qui ont accueilli ces PAPs ne sont certes pas suffisantes, mais le Gouvernement salue surtout l'intégration parfaite entre les populations au sein desquelles on constate que la paix y règne. Les effets négatifs des corridors dont parle le rapport d'évaluation indépendante sont, du point de vue du Gouvernement, à minimiser.

De nos jours, les corridors n'ont pas fait l'objet d'occupation ou de réoccupation bien que le projet soit clôturé il ya de cela deux ans. Le passage des animaux sauvages, notamment des éléphants du PNKT au Ranch de Gibier de Nazinga dans le corridor 1 est effectif présentement.

### **3.5. Gestion des ressources naturelles partagées (autre d'acquis du PAGEN)**

La création des corridors a également joué un rôle très positif dans le renforcement de la coopération entre le Ghana et le Burkina Faso en matière de gestion partagée des ressources transfrontalières à travers un protocole signé le 18 juillet 2008. Les négociations ont été faites dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de deux projets de biodiversité, financés par le FEM et administrés par la Banque Mondiale dans les deux pays. Il s'agit du projet de Partenariat pour l'Amélioration de la Gestion des Ecosystèmes Naturels (PAGEN – Burkina Faso) et du Northern Savannah Biodiversity Conservation Project (NSBCP – Ghana). Le processus de l'élaboration du protocole a été conduit par l'UICN – Burkina sous forme de prestation de service financée par le PAGEN.

Avec le Mali, le même processus de gestion des ressources partagées a commencé sous les auspices de l'UICN avec des rencontres entre les autorités des deux pays. Le PAGEN a permis un brassage entre les populations du sahel Burkinabè et celles du Gourma Malien. De nos jours, le dossier pour l'établissement du protocole sur la gestion partagée des ressources naturelles est reversé à la commission mixte Burkina Faso-Mali pour la mise en place éventuelle d'un protocole.

Le Gouvernement du Burkina Faso marque toute sa satisfaction pour ces protocoles de gestion transfrontalière des ressources partagées.

En terme donc de résultats, on peut dire que la création des corridors reste un acquis durable sur le plan de la préservation de la diversité biologique, de l'intégration des populations locales et des PAPs et de la coopération avec le Ghana et le Mali en matière de gestion partagée des ressources naturelles.

### **4.7. Zone sylvopastorale de Soulougré**

La zone sylvopastorale de Soulougré (partie nord du PNKT) dans le Zoundwéogo avait été aménagée pour accueillir les éleveurs transhumants afin d'éviter leur occupation illégale du parc. Le PAGEN a contribué à renforcer ces aménagements par la mise à disposition de puits pastoraux, de parcs de vaccination, de silos pour le stockage du foin. Les éleveurs ont été formés et encadrés pour la récolte du fourrage.

Le rapport d'évaluation indépendante souligne le mécontentement des éleveurs. Cela se comprend aisément du fait que ces éleveurs n'ont plus l'accès aux ressources fourragères du PNKT. Le Gouvernement tient à souligner que les objectifs du parc, classé en 1970, visent la conservation des ressources biologiques qui ne sauraient être détruites par des groupes de personnes pour des intérêts personnels. Le PAGEN a été souple dans son intervention, aucun éleveur pris en flagrant délit de pâturage dans le parc n'a été verbalisé. Les initiatives prises par le PAGEN à travers un processus participatif de négociations pour permettre aux éleveurs d'entreprendre leurs activités hors du parc ont permis de répondre au mieux les besoins de ces éleveurs. Du point de vue du Gouvernement, le recasement des éleveurs et les infrastructures mises à leur disposition ne devraient pas être qualifiés de négatif.

## 5. Notations (Ratings)

### Pertinence (Relevance)

**5.1, 5.2 et 5.3.** Sur le plan de la vision du Burkina Faso en matière de gestion des ressources naturelles, l'objectif du PAGEN reste de nos jours valable et prioritaire car la préservation des ressources naturelles dans les aires protégées profite substantiellement aux communautés riveraines. **L'objectif de développement reste hautement pertinent**, contrairement au rapport de l'évaluation indépendante qui indique que la crise alimentaire a relayé la préservation des ressources naturelles dans les aires protégées. Bien au contraire, cette crise alimentaire pourrait être atténuée pour les populations riveraines des aires protégées si ces aires protégées étaient bien gérées.

### 5.10 et 5.11. Empiètement agricole dans les zones d'intervention du PAGEN

Le rapport de l'évaluation indépendante indique que le pourcentage d'occupation de l'espace cultivé autour des zones du projet après sa clôture a augmenté de 15 à 49 % à la Comoé-Léraba, 43 à 93 % à Boulon-Koflandé et 58 à 77 % à la réserve de biosphère de la Mare aux Hippopotames.

Le Gouvernement reconnaît que des occupations ponctuelles sont intervenues au niveau des trois aires ci-dessus citées. Cette situation s'explique par la non poursuite du PAGEN avec le départ des équipes d'animation. Cependant, les pourcentages d'occupation ne sont pas aussi élevés que le rapport le souligne.

Contrairement aux termes du rapport qui soulignent que les communautés sont délaissées après le projet, le Gouvernement tient à mentionner que dans les trois zones ci-dessus indiquées, les AGEREF sont toujours mobilisées pour poursuivre les activités de sensibilisation et de surveillance en collaboration avec le service forestier. Cela fait partie des acquis indéniables du projet PAGEN pour assurer la durabilité de la gestion des ressources naturelles.

### Conclusion

Le Gouvernement du Burkina Faso reconnaît la pertinence du projet PAGEN qui vise la sauvegarde de la diversité biologique. Le Gouvernement apprécie positivement les résultats atteints par le projet PAGEN malgré les contraintes rencontrées pendant sa mise en œuvre. Concernant la mise en œuvre des mesures

de sauvegarde environnement et sociale, les résultats actuels au niveau des sites sont satisfaisants quand bien même des difficultés ont été rencontrées au moment de l'opération.

Sur la base des informations ci-dessus fournies le gouvernement souhaiterait la révision des notations par le Groupe des Evaluateurs Indépendants.

Enfin, le Gouvernement marque sa satisfaction à la coopération entre la Banque Mondiale et le Burkina Faso en matière de préservation et de gestion durable des ressources naturelles.