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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA
COMMUNITY BASED POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECT (Cr. 3447, Cr. 3447-1)

June 30, 2014

IEG Public Sector Evaluation
Independent Evaluation Group

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = Nigerian Naira

2000	US$1.00	NGN101.70
2001	US$1.00	NGN111.23
2002	US$1.00	NGN120.58
2003	US$1.00	NGN129.22
2004	US$1.00	NGN132.89
2005	US$1.00	NGN131.27
2006	US$1.00	NGN128.65
2007	US$1.00	NGN125.81
2008	US$1.00	NGN118.55
2009	US$1.00	NGN148.90

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
CAPPA	Community Action Program for Poverty Alleviation
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDD	Community-Driven Development
CPRP	Community Based Poverty Reduction Project
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
CSDP	Community and Social Development Project
CWIQ	Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire
DCA	Development Credit Agreement
DHS	Demographic Health Survey
GM	General Manager
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IEGPS	IEG Public Sector
IFC	International Finance Corporation
ISN	Interim Strategy Note
ISR	Implementation Supervision Report
LGA	Local Government Area
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIS	Management Information System
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPC	National Planning Commission
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objective
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
SEEDS	State Empowerment and Economic Development Strategies
WBG	World Bank Group

Fiscal Year

Government: January 1 – December 31

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This report was prepared by Elena Bardasi, who assessed the project in May 2013. The report was peer reviewed by Hailu Mekonnen and panel reviewed by Pia Schneider. Viktoriya Yevsyeyeva provided administrative support.

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Principal Ratings

	ICR*	ICR Review*	PPAR
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEGWB product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

Key Staff Responsible

Project	Task Manager/Leader	Division Chief/ Sector Director	Country Director
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IEG Mission: Improving World Bank Group development results through excellence in evaluation.

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20-25 percent of the Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEG peer review, Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank department. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

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Outcome: The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. *Possible ratings for Outcome:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High, Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Preface

This report is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for a Community Based Poverty Reduction Project in Nigeria (CPRP, P069086). The CPRP was approved by the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors on December 20, 2000. The total project cost at appraisal was US$60 million in IDA credit. The Development Credit Agreement was amended in May 2005 to allow two additional states to receive project funding. It was followed by an Additional Financing Credit of US$25 million approved on February 1, 2007. The actual project cost was $103.8 million (including the communities contribution; US$94 million in IDA only), about US$6 million more than estimated (including the Additional Financing). The project closed on March 31, 2009.

This report was prepared by Elena Bardasi, Senior Economist, IEG. A data analysis of the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) was provided by Mr. Marc Spitz, under the supervision of Elena Bardasi. The findings are largely based on a two-week mission to Nigeria from May 28, 2013 to June 7, 2013, conducted by Elena Bardasi. During the same time period, Ms. Susan Caceres, Senior Education Specialist, also conducted a mission to examine the State Education Sector Project (P096151).

In Abuja, the mission met with functionaries of the Federal Ministry of Finance (the implementing agency at the Federal level at time of project closing), former authorities of the National Planning Commission, and key staff and management of the National Bureau of Statistics. It also visited a number of micro-projects in Kwara, one of the States involved in the CPRP. During the field visits, the mission was accompanied by Mr. Sumaila, General Manager of the CPRP Kwara State Agency, and his team, as well as by Mr. Onuoha, National Coordinator of the Community and Social Development Project (CSDP), the follow-up project to the CPRP. The General Managers of the CPRP (and most of the State Agencies staff) were confirmed in the same role in the CSDP, which greatly facilitated gathering of information. The mission only visited micro-projects in Kwara as security conditions and time constraints did not permit visits to other States. General Managers of other CPRP States sent documents and data via email and responded to a questionnaire prepared and administered for this evaluation. The mission also met with key staff of the Bank in Washington and Abuja. The list of persons met is in Annex C. Preparation for the mission and report involved examination of: (a) World Bank project files, (b) Project related reporting documents and evaluations, including data provided by the General Managers of the CPRP State Agencies, and (c) Studies with data from the government, the Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics, and other development partners, as well as the relevant research literature.

The IEG team gratefully acknowledges the logistical assistance and support of the staff in the Abuja Office of the World Bank and the support from Mr. Sumaila, General Manager of the Kwara State Agency of the CPRP (and currently of the CSDP), and his staff.

Following standard IEG procedures, a copy of the draft report was sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and feedback. No comments were received.

Summary

The purpose of this report is to assess the development effectiveness of the Community Based Poverty Reduction Project (CPRP) in Nigeria (CPRP, P069086). Poverty reduction remains a major challenge in Nigeria, in both urban and—especially—rural areas. Although the Nigerian economy is growing, the proportion of the population living in poverty is increasing every year. The latest figures indicate that in 2010, 69 percent of the population—or 112 million people—were poor. The most recent social indicators show signs of progress in some areas—especially the under-five and maternal mortality rates—and delays in others, such as access to safe water and sanitation.

The objectives of the CPRP (2000–-2009), as stated in the Project Appraisal Document and in the Credit Agreement, were (i) to improve access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure; and (ii) to increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level. An International Development Association (IDA) credit of US$60 million followed by an Additional Financing Credit of US$25 million in 2007 supported the project in eight states—six since the beginning (Abia, Cross River, Ekiti, Kebbi, Kogi, and Yobe) and two joining in 2005 (Kwara and Ebonyi).

When the CPRP was designed, poverty rates were alarmingly high, especially in rural areas and despite periods of positive economic growth. The pre-1999 Structural Adjustment Programs had failed to alleviate poverty. Between 1980 and 1996 poverty had dramatically increased in the country from 28.1 percent to 65.6 percent. Social indicators, especially health indicators, showed that poverty in Nigeria was a multi-faceted, multi-dimensional phenomenon and that a rapid worsening of the situation occurred over the short period from 1999 to 2003. The CPRP was based on the principle of involving communities in the design and implementation of poverty reduction programs. At that time, this was a very new approach for Nigeria.

The bulk of the project funding (US$60 million) supported community-based initiatives in building and restructuring basic social and economic infrastructure. It did so through the creation of independent state-level social funds, which provided funding for micro-projects that met specific selection criteria, such as broad-based community participation in project selection and a matching contribution from communities. Other activities supported by the project were capacity building activities, including the institutional strengthening of the poverty monitoring; project development activities in the National Planning Commission (in charge of overseeing project implementation at the Federal level and monitoring activities implemented at the state level); and training at the state and local government area (LGA) level for improving the capacity of monitoring the impact of state programs on poverty.

The project outcome is rated as **moderately satisfactory.** This is based on **substantial** relevance of objectives; **modest** relevance of design; **substantial** achievement of the objective to improve access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure, and **modest** achievement of the objective to increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level. Efficiency was **substantial**.

The relevance of project objectives was **substantial**. The objectives were fully aligned with the new strategic approach of the Federal Government of Nigeria to reduce poverty (i.e., the Community Action Program for Poverty Alleviation, prepared by the National Planning Commission in 1996, and later on the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, finalized in 2004) which was centered on a community-based approach. Relevance of design was **modest**. The CPRP was the first large scale poverty reduction project implemented by local communities. It represented a sweeping change in approach with respect to the traditional implementation of projects led by the Federal Government, which had failed to achieve sustained poverty reduction. Yet, the results framework was not fully developed nor explicitly discussed, and the final outcome of reducing poverty was not strongly linked to the inputs through an unambiguous results chain.

The project funded a much larger number of micro-projects than originally anticipated and about 3,000 were completed. More than 90 percent of them were still being maintained one year after completion and at the time of this evaluation, which was four years after the project closed. The majority of micro-projects focused on education infrastructure (37 percent of all micro-projects) and water supply (31 percent) followed by health (10 percent) and feeder roads and bridges (9 percent). In the eight states supported by the CPRP, 3,085 communities (accounting for about 10.3 million residents) benefited directly or indirectly from as many micro-projects. There is evidence, although based on small sample sizes, that the newly created social and economic infrastructure increased the well-being of the poor. In particular, school enrollment and the quality of teaching conditions increased due to additional classrooms and labs; commuting time and the incidence of flooding along the roads decreased due to improved rural roads; and the number of people using health centers increased since more were built. Women, in particular, benefited from water projects, which drastically cut the time required to fetch water for the household.

Although the project succeeded in increasing the ability of poor communities to control and manage funds for their own development activities, it did not create strong and lasting linkages between government and local communities, especially at the LGA level. Also, there is only limited evidence of an increased number of federally supported programs using community-based initiatives or an increased number and quality of community-based activities undertaken by states, which raises doubts about the approach being fully embraced at the institutional level. The project, therefore, was not successful in institutionalizing the community-based development approach. The project established a synergy between communities and state agencies based on a transfer of funds and training to support micro-projects, but a similar relationship was not established with the government at local, state, or federal levels.

The risk to development outcome is rated moderate. The longer term sustainability of micro-projects cannot just rely on the communities' contributions, but it also depends on the government (at all levels) increasing its involvement in maintaining the infrastructure built through the project. The experience of the CPRP was used to design and implement a follow-up project, the Community and Social Development Project (CSDP), which addresses some of the shortcomings of the CPRP.

The performance of the Bank is rated **moderately satisfactory** at entry, **satisfactory** during supervision, and **moderately satisfactory** overall. Limitations were found in the project design. The results chain in particular was not fully developed, which resulted in insufficient project preparation of some key aspects such as a proper assessment of the capacity of the National Planning Commission. The (monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework was also largely undefined, and its overall quality is rated **modest**. The borrower's performance is rated moderately satisfactory. At the federal level, the government demonstrated to be willing to commit to the community-based development approach, but in reality the weak capacity of the government—including in collecting and analyzing poverty data—resulted in poor coordination among government bodies and between government and state agencies. At the local level, the LGAs' performance was particularly weak.

Lessons

Based on the experience of this project, several lessons can be drawn.

- **Community-based initiatives need to be integrated and coordinated with the broader poverty reduction strategy of the government in order to effectively tackle poverty reduction**. The CPRP was overall successful in increasing access of poor rural communities to water, education, and other social and economic infrastructure. However, to achieve profound and lasting impacts on poverty reduction, key elements are greater collaboration and partnership of the communities with their local government authorities and active support of the relevant sectoral ministries. This was recognized in the Project Appraisal Document of the follow-up project (i.e., CSDP).

- **For micro-projects to be sustainable in the long run, the community-based development approach needs to engender and nurture a strong relationship between the local communities and the government at all levels**. The collaboration between communities and local government is crucial not only to achieve poverty reduction but also for *functional* reasons, that is to:

    (i) guarantee **financial sustainability**. Financial sustainability requires that micro-projects rely on a more stable financial basis than community contributions (especially of poor communities) for maintenance and expansion. It also requires buy-in of the approach by the government, so that resources from the federal, state, and local budget are allocated to community-based development projects whenever this is identified as the most appropriate approach;

    (ii) ensure the integration of the community-built infrastructure with the (larger) state and government infrastructure.

- **Development projects (including community-development projects) need to be coherent and complementary in the larger picture**. This complementarity can originate within the project itself (the CSDP replaced the one-project per community rule with the project *plan* per community) through harmonization across different projects (as required by the Country Partnership Strategy 2005-2009) or coordination between the CDD approach and the government provision. This latter approach would also produce institutional strengthening as an additional benefit. Attempts to construct or rehabilitate a clinic are impractical if it is not easily accessible, supplied with water and electricity, and adequately staffed.

- **The M&E framework is especially crucial for community-based development projects.** The CPRP is an example of a project that was likely more successful than the M&E data can possibly tell. Key indicators were regularly collected and used by state agencies to carry out desk and field assessments of proposals, as well as the selection and funding of micro-projects, and to monitor the realization of the community infrastructure. But very little was collected on targeting, the participatory process, and impacts on the well-being of the communities. This lack of information, besides preventing a full evaluation of the achievements of the project, also limits a deep understanding of the mechanisms that may enhance or weaken the CDD approach. Because of an inadequate M&E framework in the CPRP, there is no clear evidence of how the poor were reached and the empowerment process that led them to learn to identify and act upon their needs.

- **Community-development projects, when properly designed, have the potential of addressing the needs of community members who are traditionally marginalized or not adequately represented.** There is limited evidence that women's needs were properly represented in the selection of the CPRP micro-projects. A constant effort was made to ensure that women were included in community decision-making and women's associations were encouraged to present proposals of their own. Moreover, the type of projects allowed for funding by the CPRP was especially pro-poor and generally managed in an inclusive way.

Caroline Heider
Director-General
Evaluation

1. Background and Context

1.1 This report assesses the Community Based Poverty Reduction Project in Nigeria (CPRP, P069086). The CPRP was approved by the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors on December 20, 2000 and became effective on September 28, 2001. The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) was amended in May 2005 to allow two additional states to receive project funding. It was followed by an Additional Financing Credit approved on February 1, 2007. The actual total project cost was $103.8 million. The project closed on March 31, 2009.

1.2 At the time of appraisal, the Bank was re-engaging in Nigeria after years of lending inactivity corresponding to the period of the military dictatorship (1993-1998). In 1999 President Obasanjo was elected in a democratic election and the Bank rapidly resumed lending to the country. The CPRP was one of the first investment loans that the Bank undertook even before a comprehensive Country Assistance Strategy was in place. In 1996 the government adopted the poverty reduction strategy document called "Community Action Program for Poverty Alleviation" (CAPPA), prepared by the National Planning Commission (NPC). This strategy was centered on a community-based approach to poverty alleviation, where the poor are involved in the design and implementation of projects, but also in formulating and managing poverty reduction programs. At the time of project appraisal the government was finalizing a community-based National Poverty Alleviation Policy embracing the grassroots participatory decision-making approach formulated in the CAPPA. It was also developing a Poverty Reduction Initiative providing funds to states for community-based activities.[1] The CPRP was the first poverty reduction project funded by the Bank in Nigeria, and the first using a community-driven approach to poverty reduction.

1.3 This project was selected for assessment because its objectives, size, and popularity make it relevant to the ongoing Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluation of the World Bank Group (WBG) Focus on Poverty and Results in Low-Income Countries. Moreover, this PPAR allowed for an assessment of the medium-term results (4 years after closing) of the first Community-Driven Development (CDD) Project for Nigeria.

SOCIO ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF NIGERIA

1.4 During the period 2000-2009 (corresponding to the life of the project) the Nigeria macroeconomic performance improved considerably. GDP growth, which during the 1990s barely reached 1 percent stabilized at about 6 percent during the decade. The ratio of external debt to GDP went from over 100 percent to below 10 percent. Higher crude oil prices and better fiscal and macroeconomic management contributed to improving the macroeconomic environment. While overall the economy had been doing much better in the first decade of the century than during the 1990, the agricultural sector—representing more than 40 percent of the whole economy—did not grow enough to support the large population increase

[1] The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was finalized in 2004. One of the three major objectives of the NEEDS is empowering people and improving social services delivery. The NEEDS was followed by the preparation of State Empowerment and Economic Development Strategies, or SEEDS. The NEEDS formed the basis of the Country Partnership Strategy 2005-2009.

occurred during the same period. This explains why Nigeria still has one of the highest poverty rates in the world (Fan et al. 2008).

1.5 In 2001, when the project was designed, Nigeria was going through a difficult political and economic transition after 30 years of military rule. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, poverty was still an alarming problem that periods of positive economic growth and a wealth of mineral resources and crude oil could not alleviate.. Poverty rates, which had been steadily increasing since the 1980s, attained record highs, with two-thirds of Nigerians living below the poverty line (Table 1.1). Poverty was characterized as a rural phenomenon with poverty rates reaching 70 percent in rural areas in 1996. But between 1980 and 1996 poverty had also dramatically increased in urban areas. In 2004, when the project was still under implementation, the poverty rate decreased, although the total population living in poverty did not due to population growth. In 2010, however, after the project was completed, the poverty rate was as high as 69 percent, and the population living in poverty around 112 million. The poverty rate was extremely high in rural areas (73 percent), but also in urban area (62 percent).

Table 1.1. Poverty Head Count by Year and by Urban and Rural Area

Year	Poverty Incidence (%)	Estimated Population (Million)	Population in Poverty (Million)	Urban Poverty Rate (%)	Rural Poverty Rate (%)
1980	28.1	65.0	17.7	17.2	28.3
1985	46.3	75.0	34.7	37.8	51.4
1992	42.7	91.5	39.2	37.5	46.0
1996	65.6	102.3	67.1	58.2	69.8
2004	54.4	126.3	68.7	43.2	63.3
2010	69.0	163.0	112.5	61.8	73.2

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), based on National Consumer Surveys 1980-1996, Nigeria Living Standard Survey, 2004 and Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey, 2010

1.6 An analysis of social indicators (Table 1.2) reveals that poverty in Nigeria is a multi-faceted, multi-dimensional phenomenon. Many social indicators are at worrisome levels. For example, less than 60 percent of the population has access to safe water and sanitation. Yet, many social indicators were much worse at the start of the project and some of them (the health indicators in particular) worsen between 2000 and 2003. The under-five mortality rate increased from 168/1000 in 1999 to 201/1000 in 2003 and the infant mortality rate from 90/1000 to 100/1000 over the same period. Stunting prevalence had worsened from 30 percent to 38 percent and fertility rate had increased from 5.2 to 5.7 and then again to 6 according to the most recent statistics. At the turn of the century, the maternal mortality rate was 704/100,000, and dramatically high especially in rural areas (828/100,000). By contrast, education indicators had been showing sign of improvement, with the literacy rate increasing from 52.7 percent to 60.4 percent between 1999 and 2003 (but worsening again to 58 percent according to the latest statistics), and the net enrolment rate in primary school from 56.8 percent to 60.1 percent in 2003—but stable or slightly decreasing afterwards.

1.7 The Nigerian economy is characterized by the paradox of growth without poverty reduction and was facing the great challenge of designing and adopting poverty reduction strategies that could really be poverty reducing, given the clear failure of the trickle down effect of growth on the poor. The community-based approach to poverty reduction was adopted as a novel approach with the CPRP to address this particular challenge.

Table 1.2. Social Indicators for Nigeria

	1999	*2003*	*2008-2012**
1. Under-five mortality rate	168/1000	201/1000	124/1000
2. Under five mortality rate (Urban)	129/1000	-	-
3. Under five mortality rate (Rural)	192/1000	-	-
4. Infant mortality rate	90/1000	100/1000	78/1000
5. Stunting prevalence	30.0%	38.0%	35.8%
6. Accessible to safe water	54.2%	42.0%	58.9%
7. Literacy rate	52.7%	60.4%	51.1%
8. Contraceptive prevalence	8.6%	13.0%	17.5%
9. Net primary school enrolment rate	56.8%	60.1%	57.6%
10. Maternal mortality rate	704/100,000	-	550/100,000
11. Maternal mortality rate (Urban)	351/100,000	-	-
12. Maternal mortality rate (Rural)	828/100,000	-	-
13. Total Fertility rate	5.2	5.7	6

Source: reproduced from National Bureau of Statistics, 2005. Original data from a combination of NDHS, MICS 1999, NDHS 2003
Note: * from UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nigeria_statistics.html, last accessed May 5, 2014. Most recent year between 2008-2012.

1.8 The Structural Adjustment Programs pre-1999 failed in alleviating poverty and determined an increase in inequality—including inequality of access to food, housing, education, health, and other basic needs.[2] When the CPRP project was designed, the government was in the process of re-thinking its strategic approach to poverty reduction. In order to tackle the deep and persistent rural poverty, and a number of other development challenges (including the excessively low growth rate, high macroeconomic volatility, dismal shape of the social and economic infrastructure, widespread corruption, unfriendly business environment, and high unemployment rate among others), the government engaged in a new strategic approach—which was going to culminate in the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) launched in 2004. This approach was based on three pillars: (i) empowering people and improving social delivery; (ii) fostering private sector led growth through creating the appropriate enabling environment, and (iii) enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of government, by changing the way government operates. It is against this backdrop that the CPRP was designed.

[2] According to the IEG Nigeria Country Assistance Evaluation (World Bank, 2010) this traditional, top-down approach to poverty reduction was unsuccessful because "it had been characterized by poor targeting, poor design, and inefficient and incomplete implementation, and had generated increasing frustration among the population." (p. 73)

2. Objectives, Design, and their Relevance

PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

2.1 The CPRP (2000-2009) was approved on December 20, 2000. It had the following Project Development Objectives (PDOs) as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, World Bank 2000, page 2):

(a) "to improve access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure;" and

(b) "to increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level."

The PAD statement of objectives was identical to that in the DCA, and forms the benchmark for evaluating the project.

2.2 Six states were selected to participate in the social fund mechanism of the CPRP—Abia, Cross River, Ekiti, Kebbi, Kogi, and Yobe. These states were selected by the Federal Government as having the highest poverty levels in their respective regions based on Federal Office of Statistics data and/or showing commitment to community-based projects.[3] Another six states joined the project in Phase II, after the initial six states established their programs. According to the PAD the six additional states were meant to be Benue, Delta, Enugu, Gombe, Osun and Zamfara; however, the states that joined in the second phase were Edo, Gombe, Osun, Zamfara, Ebonyi, and Kwara—the latter two funded by the World Bank, and the former four funded by the African Development Bank.

RELEVANCE OF OBJECTIVES

2.3 The project's objectives were **substantially** relevant to past and current World Bank country assistance strategies.

2.4 The project objectives were relevant to the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2005-2009, at project closing. In this document the objective of empowering people is subsumed under the pillar "improving service delivery for human development" and the CDD approach is understood as functional to provide basic social services and tackle the MDGs. Moreover, Community Driven Development-type projects in the social and productive sectors are adopted as a form of support to the livelihoods of poor people in those states that are not identified as "lead states". While embracing the CDD approach, the CPS underscores the urgency of harmonizing and consolidating CDD activities and improving efficiency and effectiveness of project management and service delivery to communities. The emphasis on the CDD approach was stronger in previous country strategies. The most recent CPS (2010-2013) defines the CDD approach a success and recognizes the need of greater involvement of civil society organizations and community monitoring: "Building on the solid foundation of

[3] A technical committee set up by the government in August 1999 and comprising the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Federal Office of Statistics, and the National Planning Commission ranked all the states according to their poverty levels based on data available and in accordance with the six geo-political zones of the country. The objective was to identify the poorest states, but retaining geo-political and regional balance. The committee also determined the initial amount to be allocated to each state, based on their capacity to absorb funds.

the successful CDD approach, the current CPS will include increased CSO and community monitoring and evaluation, planning and budgeting at sector and local levels, and will pilot new participatory approaches for monitoring and evaluation and service delivery at the local levels." (World Bank, 2009, p. 21).

2.5 The World Bank Group Interim Nigeria Country Strategy Note (ISN) approved in 2000 underlined the importance of reaching the poor with targeted poverty programs in addition to supporting the government in achieving broadly-based economic growth. Although not explicitly a pillar of the Interim Strategy 2000,[4] community involvement in identifying local needs and in managing and implementing micro-project was highlighted as a key feature of several projects under preparation at that time—including the CPRP. The IDA/IFC Joint Interim Strategy Update approved by the Board in 2001 explicitly adopted as one of its three pillars "enabling local communities to take charge of their own development" and recognized the CDD approach as fundamental to the achievement of any poverty reduction strategy.

2.6 The project objectives are vague and not framed in terms of well-defined and measurable development outcomes.

PROJECT DESIGN

2.7 The project contained two components:

(a) **Capacity-building, Managed by the National Planning Commission** (estimated cost at appraisal $3.9 million; actual cost $21.62 million): This component was to support the institutional strengthening of the poverty monitoring and project development activities in the NPC; to help the NPC implement or contract out advocacy for the community-driven development approach in all states; to provide resources for capacity building at the state and LGA level and for monitoring impact of state programs on poverty; and to improve the capacity of the NPC to oversee implementation of this component of the project and to monitor activities implemented at the state level.

(b) **Community-based initiatives in basic social and economic infrastructure** (estimated cost at appraisal $56.1 million; actual cost $ 59.83 million). This component was to support the creation of independent state-level social funds to provide funding for community-initiated activities based on specific selection criteria, including broad-based community participation in project selection and a matching contribution from communities. Activities included the establishment of independent state-level social funds in eight states; support for community identification of needs and priorities; information, education and communication campaigns on community-based projects; soliciting, appraising, approving, financing, supervising and evaluating micro-projects developed and implemented by community-based groups; monitoring and evaluation of micro-projects.

[4] The Interim Nigeria Country Strategy 2000 had one over-arching objective—assisting the Nigerian authorities in their efforts to rapidly reduce poverty.

RELEVANCE OF DESIGN

2.8 The relevance of design is rated **modest**.

2.9 At the time of appraisal the project was innovative for Nigeria in that it was the first large scale poverty reduction project implemented by local communities. The CPRP represented a change with respect to the traditional implementation of poverty reduction projects led by the federal government with little or no involvement of local communities.[5] At the time the project was designed, the NPC was drafting the new Poverty Reduction Plan, which adhered to the spirit and overall objectives of the 1996 CAPPA plan. In particular, the draft had set as guiding principles the adoption of demand-driven projects, involving community participation in design and implementation and decentralized decision making. The CPRP was designed to reflect these principles. The adoption of a community approach to poverty reduction was very coherent with the strategic choices of the country.

2.10 The results framework of the project, though, was not sufficiently developed and explicitly discussed. The final outcome of reducing poverty—interpreted in this case as increased access to services by the poor (first project development objective)—was not strongly linked to the inputs through an unambiguous results chain and not clearly integrated with the second development objective ("increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level"). The weakness of the result framework was reflected in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) indicators that were not properly able to capture project performance.

2.11 The first development objective is expressed in terms of intermediate outcome rather than final development outcome. Access to social and economic infrastructure does not automatically imply "improved well-being of the poor" (increased education, improved health, decrease in incidence of diseases and infant mortality due to better access to safe water, etc.). The second objective is literally an output. It refers to an increased mobilization of (financial) resources at the local level. There is no detail on who should provide those resources. In the context of the project, communities are to receive funds from the project. But the wording suggests that, in a longer-term perspective, communities are expected to grow in their ability to access and manage development funds, which should reach them more regularly (plausibly from the government, the PAD seems to imply). The objective is vague in this respect. The special country conditions at the time of appraisal, the still short experience of the Bank in implementing CDD projects, and the novelty of the approach for Nigeria explain the apparently unambitious formulation of the PDOs. At the time of appraisal, the involvement of communities in poverty reduction projects from the early design stage to completion had never been experienced and the level of trust between communities and government was very low.

2.12 The participatory approach was included in the PAD as a goal of the project (second development objective) but is *de facto* treated as a mean to poverty reduction, not an end in itself. The second project development objective did not speak about empowerment of local communities, or increased capacity of the poor to act upon their own development, or even

[5] The PAD is very explicit in stating that "[The Federal Government] has concluded that it's [sic] former policies and projects aimed at poverty reduction (e.g. FEAP) have not proven successful, mainly as they have not involved communities in design and implementation" (World Bank, 2000, p. 8).

improved governance at the local level, but was formulated as a *functional* step—as an output (or an intermediate outcome at best) rather than an outcome of the project. The PAD highlights a number of positive implications of the community approach, including better targeting of beneficiaries, improved efficiency of the use of resources, increased sustainability of the infrastructure created by the project, and more generally increased chances of success of poverty reduction programs.[6] These arguments support the interpretation of community participation as an *intermediate outcome* in the results framework. Not considering community participation as a goal in itself may explain why indicators of participation were not collected in the M&E.

2.13 *The two components of the CPRP are not well balanced*. Although the first component of CPRP focused on strengthening capacity of the government, the PDO does not include any reference to improving government's capacity at all levels to implement and manage community-based poverty reduction projects, and there are no key outcome indicators related to it.[7] As it is written in the PAD, Component #1 is not organically integrated into the project design. This component was also originally allocated very little funding, which had to be increased later on (it almost tripled by the end of the project)—and mostly in relation to the preparation of the subsequent project (CSDP). As a result, the design has a strong component related to the implementation of micro-projects at the community level, but a much weaker component aimed to integrate the approach at the institutional level. Institutional strengthening at various government levels is not especially emphasized.

2.14 *The categories of micro-projects that qualified for funding were likely too narrowly defined*. Restricting the project to social and economic infrastructure ensured a better targeting to the poor, who generally are more likely to benefit from this type of projects. Yet it could be argued that the scope of the project may have been too narrow, in terms of type of micro-projects envisaged. The PAD recognized that "[w]hile poverty is more easily identifiable by levels of income and other welfare indicators, the root cause is widely acknowledged to be the lack of social and economic infrastructure to boost the labour potential of the poor" (PAD, p. 2). Yet, income generating activities were explicitly excluded by the project—as highlighted by the guidelines for approval of community micro-projects.[8] Excluding income generating activities may have made the project less effective than it would have been if micro-projects directly supporting productive activities had been included. Communities were requested to contribute towards micro-projects and were supposed to maintain the infrastructure after the project ended. The ability to pay (and to continue to be able to pay) was never analyzed and tested, but it was simply assumed and had

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[6] "Better design and project targeting through increased local control will ensure increased efficiency in reaching the poor" (PAD, p. 6); "In many cases, community participation is not solicited in planning and implementation, which leads to lack of maintenance and low sustainability of the program." (PAD, p. 8); "...there is evidence that when communities are involved in the design and implementation of programs, these are more likely to succeed" (PAD, p. 8).

[7] The importance of strengthening the institutional and functional links between community-based organizations and local government is stressed by the IDA/IFC Joint Interim Strategy Update 2001, which highlights that "Community-driven development involves, among other activities, strengthening and financing accountable and inclusive community-based organizations (CBOs) that represent the interests of the poor, and forging functional links between CBOs and LGAs."

[8] Data provided by the country managers for this evaluation indicates that indeed the selection of micro-projects adhered to the guidelines in this respect, and whenever income generating activities micro-projects were presented they were rejected.

to originate from outside the project (given that the project did not support income generating activities). However, the project did not collect data on community livelihoods (either during the preparatory phase or at a later stage), and it did not coordinate with other projects supporting income-generating activities (such as FADAMA).[9] The fact that proposals for income generating activities were submitted indicates that communities were likely to consider these as priorities. The exclusion of micro-projects supporting income generating activities was addressed by the follow-up project (the CSDP), which allowed for this type of micro-projects as well, thus recognizing this as a drawback of CPRP.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION DESIGN

2.15 *Roles and responsibilities for project M&E were not clearly spelled out in the PAD.* At the project level, the PAD assigned to the state agencies the task of setting up both a Management Information System (MIS) to track quantitative information of the project activities (number, size, and state of advancement of micro-projects)[10] and a "participatory" M&E system to track community participation in decision-making and the impact of project activities on beneficiaries (PAD, p. 20). At the federal level, the NPC was assigned the role of setting up an M&E framework and a MIS for the entire project and compiling the M&E data received from the state agencies. The Federal Office of Statistics was to conduct periodic surveys to monitor project outcomes. However, the PAD did not identify in detail the roles and responsibilities of the state agencies and the government at various levels in collecting, reporting, and using monitoring data.

2.16 *At project appraisal stage, a well-defined M&E system did not exist and the M&E framework was particularly weak.* Three were the key performance indicators identified by the PAD (Table 2.1, in bold), corresponding to the three main dimensions of the PDO. One is clearly an output rather than an outcome ("Number of micro-projects operational and maintained one year after completion"). Another one –"Increased funding controlled by poor communities" – could be classified as an intermediate outcome, but only if it is meant to capture the *increased capacity* of the communities to control and manage local funding rather than the mere transfer of funding to the communities. The third one is an outcome indicator, but its formulation is so broad ("Increased number of poor with access to social and economic infrastructure") to potentially accommodate very different approaches to its measurement. A fourth outcome indicator ("Students enrolled in primary education, disaggregated by gender") was added much later. It first appeared in the Implementation Supervision Report (ISR) #17, dated August 31, 2008, four months before the project closing date at that point in time, with no baseline value.[11] Although institutional strengthening was not emphasized in the Results Framework, the main project development indicators do include two (output) indicators of the adoption of the community-development approach by the government and the states—the number of federally supported programs using community-based initiatives and the number and quality of community-based activities undertaken by states. The PAD clearly stresses the importance of examining the composition of beneficiary groups to assess whether the decision-making process had included social

[9] The CPRP M&E framework, for example, did not include any variable capturing which other projects were being implemented in the community.
[10] The MIS was to be standardized across States in order to allow the NPC to compile homogenous data.
[11] The closing date was subsequently extended of another three months.

groups that are often excluded (PAD, p. 13); however, it provides no further detail on the variables that the monitoring framework should have included.

2.17 *Baseline values did not exist at the time of project approval.* Because there was no M&E system in place, baseline data did not exist either at the project level or at the federal level, even if the PAD indicated the NPC was to undertake surveys with project preparation facility financing in order to *provide baseline (and subsequently follow-up) data* to assess "social development outcomes" for the project areas.[12] Moreover, follow-up qualitative surveys were to be carried out to examine issues such as beneficiary satisfaction with project procedures, accountability, and transparency in the project selection process at the community level. Social development outcome indicators were also to be included among the quantitative data collected by the MIS over the project implementation period (PAD, p. 14).

2.18 A target of 50 percent women beneficiaries was included as part of the main outcome indicator. This target was later increased to 70 percent. No details are provided in the PAD on how and why this target was chosen, and how it was supposed to be monitored (i.e. how the women beneficiaries were supposed to be counted). At appraisal, the attention to gender was limited to ensuring adequate participation of women in sharing the benefits of the project, in terms of access to social and economic infrastructure. Women's participation in the decision-making process implied by the community-driven development approach was not discussed. The relationship between the two is clearly spelled out in the Joint Interim Strategy 2001: "While women's roles are changing, women are under-represented at most levels of authority. This seems particularly the case in traditional communities and at the local government level. This has important implications for ensuring gender-responsiveness in Community-Driven Development (CDD) work" (Joint Interim Strategy 2001).

[12] The PAD refers to "social development outcomes" without spelling out in detail what these outcomes are supposed to be, how they fit into the result framework, and how they are supposed to be measured. It mentions that the NPC was to carry out CWIQ (Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire) surveys. This suggests that a broad range of socio-economic variables may have been expected to be impacted by the project and that "poverty" had to be intended as a multidimensional concept, but this point is not developed in the PAD. The capacity building activities under Component #1 were meant to increase the capacity of the NPC and other government agencies to fulfill their M&E role.

Table 2.1. Project Development Indicators

PDO	Improve access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure	Increase the availability of development resources at the community level	Increase the management of development resources at the community level
Indicators	Increased number of poor with access to social and economic infrastructure in 1,800 communities (50 percent women).[a] Students enrolled in primary education (number of girls and boys).[b]	Increased funding (US$ 55m)[c] controlled by poor communities. Increased number of federally supported programs using community-based initiatives. Increased number and quality of community-based activities undertaken by states.	Number of micro-projects operational and maintained 1 year after completion (at least 1,200).[d] Improved services and infrastructure in 800 communities in 12 states. Number of health centers built or rehabilitated.[b] Number of classrooms built and/or rehabilitated.[b] State agencies for community-based initiatives are legally established in 12 states.

Source: Derived by author from the Project Appraisal Document and ISRs.
a. The target was increased to 2,000 communities and 70 percent women with additional financing.
b. These specific indicators appear for the first time in the ISR #17, 08/31/2008.
c. The target was increased to US$ 70m with additional financing.
d. The target was increased to 2,200 with additional financing.
In bold are indicators that are identified by the PAD as Outcome/Impact indicators (PAD, Annex 1, p. 18)

IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

2.19 The project assigned a key role to the (state-level) Community Development Agencies in channeling the funds to communities, managing the selection process of the community proposals, monitoring the implementation of micro-projects, and reporting to the Federal Government (the National Planning Commission—see Figure 2.1). The Communities Development Agencies were established as autonomous state agencies, exempt from public sector civil service rules. To increase transparency and coordination, the boards of directors of the state agencies were to include stakeholders from civil society and representatives of the government. The state agencies were designed to operate like private firms, with a small staff employed on the basis of performance contracts, competitive remuneration and high performance standards, and run by a General Manager (GM) whose role was made incompatible with any type of public sector employment. Because of their operational autonomy, the state agencies were meant to operate under strict accountability and transparency criteria through independent audits and intense public scrutiny. Figure 2.1 represents the institutional organization and governance structure of the CPRP, derived by IEG on the basis of the project's documentation.

2.20 At the Federal level, the NPC was designated as the coordination and facilitation unit. A Poverty Unit was established within the NPC that was to be responsible for overseeing project activities. This was the most logical choice, given that the NPC was the institution tasked with developing the poverty reduction strategy and as such responsible for monitoring poverty and coordinating and overseeing the implementation of poverty programs, including community-based poverty alleviation programs. Resources from the project were therefore directed to institutional strengthening of the poverty monitoring and project development activities in the NPC. Specifically, project funds were to support the NPC to finalize and disseminate the policy framework for poverty reduction and for community-based initiatives; to monitor the poverty situation in the country through qualitative and quantitative studies in conjunction with the Federal Office of Statistics; to evaluate the impact of interventions under the project; to facilitate sharing of international experience with states and state experiences across states; and to prepare more focused analytical studies (e.g. linkages between poverty and the labor market). The NPC was supposed to put in place an M&E framework and a MIS for the entire project and promptly compiling M&E data received from the state agencies.

2.21 According to the PAD, state governments and local government areas (LGAs) were both expected to work with communities in designing community-based projects. LGAs were also assigned the role of assisting state agencies in soliciting, appraising, approving, and financing micro-projects developed and implemented by community-based groups, and in monitoring and evaluating micro-projects. The PAD recognized, however, the insufficient capacity of LGA staff and the low level of trust between LGAs and communities, which justified the capacity-building activities for LGAs in the project design.

Figure 2.1. The Community-based Poverty Reduction Project (CPRP) – Institutional Organization and Governance Structure

Financing		Government level	Project level
World Bank (IDA) **African Development Bank**	**Federal level** *(first component)*	**National Planning Commission** (from 2005) **Federal Ministry of Finance** *(coordination and facilitation; M&E)* ***Project Unit*** **Federal Office of Statistics** *(M&E: baseline data for poverty monitoring)*	
Federal funds **State funds**	**State level** *(second component)*	**State government** *(set financial and procurement procedures)* - ***Governor***	**Community Development Agency (State Agency)** *(management, financing, M&E)* - ***Board of Directors*** (5-9 government and non-government members - *oversight*) - ***General Manager*** - ***Staff***
Community co-financing	**Community level**	**Local Government Area (LGA)** *(collaboration with State Agency: soliciting, appraising, approving, financing, supervising, and evaluating micro-projects)*	**Project Committee** *(project implementation – financial mngt/procur.)* Established by the Community-Based Organization where it exists, or by the Community - ***Chair; Treasurer; Secretary***

Source: IEG, based on project's documents.
Phase I pilot states: Abia, Cross River, Ekiti, Kebbi, Kogi, Yobe. Phase II states: Ebonyi, Kwara. States funded by the African Development Bank: Zamfara, Gombe, Edo and Osun

3. Implementation

Approval, Effectiveness, and Closing Dates

3.1 The project was approved by the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors on December 20, 2000; the credit was signed on May 20, 2001 and the project became effective on September 28, 2001. The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) was amended in May 2005 to allow two additional states to receive project funding. The DCA was amended a second time in August 2007 to change the coordinating unit from the National Planning Commission to the Federal Ministry of Finance.

3.2 The original closing date of February 28, 2006 was extended a first time to August 31, 2006, to accommodate the addition of two states (Kwara and Ebonyi); a second time to December 31, 2008, to accommodate and disburse an Additional Financing Credit; and finally a third time to March 31, 2009, to ensure the completion of a number of micro-projects and an impact assessment under the project in the eight project states.

Planned vs. Actual Disbursement

3.3 The original credit was US$60 million from IDA. Additional financing of US$25 million was approved by the Board on February, 1, 2007.[13] The additional financing was requested by the borrower to ensure that the micro-projects that had been started could be completed by the end of the project. The project proved to be more popular than anticipated and many requests for funding from the communities could not be met without increasing the project budget.[14] At the same time, the government wanted to consolidate the success of the project, increase its impact and development effectiveness, and use the additional financing to bridge the gap towards a nationwide adoption of the community-driven approach.

3.4 The actual project cost was US$103.8 million, based on the financial data reported in the World Bank's operation portal (for the IDA part, accounting for US$94 million), and in the ICR for the actual government and communities contributions (Table 3.1).[15] This figure contrast with the total project costs reported in the ICR ($81.45 million). The actual allocation to the second Component (Community-based activities) ended up being about US$60 million (ICR, World Bank 2009, Annex 1), about US$ 16 million less than estimated (including the Additional Financing Credit) (Table 3.1 panel B). This does not align with the justification given for the Additional Financing Credit, that the additional financing "would help finance the costs associated with a financing gap for microprojects that are underway and are therefore prerequisite in fulfilling the expectations of the poor communities" (World Bank, 2006, p. 2). At project closure the actual allocation to communities ended up being very close to what anticipated at appraisal, without the additional financing. At the same time, the actual cost of the first component was about US$12 million more than estimated at

[13] The Credit Amendment Agreement for this additional financing was signed on February 19, 2007 and became effective on May 8, 2007.
[14] At the time of approval of the additional financing close to 250 micro-projects were active but not completed and about 350 micro-projects had been appraised and not yet funded.
[15] There were exchange rate gains of about US$9.0 million over the life of the project.

appraisal, which can be explained by a gross underestimation of the costs of capacity building activities at appraisal.

Table 3.1. Bank's Lending and Project Costs (million)

	Appraisal	Additional Financing (AF)	Total appraised +AF	Actual	% of appraised
A. Project costs by source of funding					
1. IDA $	60	25	85	94[a]	110.6
XDR	*47*	*16.7*	*63.7*	*63.6*	100
2. Government $	3.5	-	3.5	2.8[e]	80
3. Communities $	6.2	3	9.2	7[e]	76.1
Total project costs (1+2+3) $	69.7[b]	28	97.7	103.8	106.2
B. Allocation by component (IDA only)					
Capacity building $	3.9[c]	5.7[d]	9.6	21.6[e]	
Community-based initiatives $	56.1[c]	19.3[d]	75.4	59.8[e]	
Unaccounted for in ICR				12.6[e]	

Note: [a] source Operation Portal (includes exchange rate gains of about US$9 million); [b] excludes contributions from the African Development Bank (US$26.7 million) which was to support 4 states not covered by the ICR; [c] source PAD (World Bank, 2000); [d] source Additional Financing project paper (World Bank, 2006); [e] source ICR (World Bank, 2009); ICR (Annex 1) underreports the amount allocated to the two components when compared with the total spent as reported by the Operation Portal.

3.5 The African Development Bank (AfDB) co-financed the project. There was a clear division of tasks between the AfDB and the World Bank—the World Bank funded six states (Abia, Cross River, Ekiti, Kebbi, Kogi, Yobe, Ebonyi, and Kwara), the AfDB four other states (Zamfara, Gombe, Edo and Osun).

3.6 At appraisal it was agreed that states and LGAs were to provide counterpart funding in the amount of US$0.38 million as part of the government contribution. This part was eventually waived because of the impossibility of the states and LGAs to meet their commitment.

Implementation Experience

3.7 Project implementation was affected by the following factors:

3.8 *The role and responsibilities of the NPC had not been clearly defined since the beginning*. Selecting the NPC as the implementing agency was a logical choice. The NPC is the Nigerian institution tasked with the formulation of poverty strategies. The NPC is also the institution responsible to coordinate donor activities and community development projects. However, the role and responsibilities of the NPC were not well specified in the PAD. Moreover, even if it was very clear at appraisal that the NPC had low capacity, very little budget allocation was provided to capacity building (Component #1). Eventually, the coordination of the project was moved to the Ministry of Finance in 2005. This made disbursement more efficient, but likely weakened the institutional component of the project. Under the Ministry of Finance the project implementation was definitely smoother; however, all activities were contracted out and no specific internal institutional competency was built on poverty monitoring and promotion of the community-based approach.[16]

3.9 *Implementation was slow in the beginning due to weak implementation capacity of the NPC, which caused delays and coordination problems.* The problems in relation to the NPC were identified in weak implementation capacity, frequent personnel changes (with the project losing trained staff), and not better specified "institutional problems" (ISRs mention that the NPC initially did not follow the manual of procedures but do not provide additional details). These issues were raised in ISRs since the beginning of the project; however, it is unclear why they haven't been dealt with earlier in the process.[17] In early 2003, based on ISRs, the situation appeared to have improved. The project team reported in the June 2003 ISR that the NPC had finally accomplished a set of activities agreed with the Bank team, including appointing new staff to the Poverty Alleviation Unit as well as a new project manager. Other crucial tasks, such as putting in place an M&E framework and a MIS for the entire project, preparing a manual for water and sanitation projects at the community level, and hiring a procurement consultant were accomplished with substantial delays.

3.10 *Institutional capacity development occurred more at the state level than at the Federal and local government levels*. Even if the PAD did envisage some level of coordination between the Local Government Administration and the CPRP state agency (especially for education and health community projects, for which the LGA was expected to commit staff and resources to ensure long term sustainability), in reality the LGAs were not involved in the CPRP. Part of the reason was that both state agencies and community organizations feared that LGAs could hijack the project and divert funds for their own purposes (ICR, p. 37). The weak LGAs capacity and their low level of involvement in the project did not impact the community management of resources (state agencies were carrying out all activities supporting the community-based initiatives), but they could have undermined the maintenance of the infrastructure being build.

3.11 *The state agencies showed a high level of dynamism and commitment since the beginning of the project*. Financial resources were channeled directly to the local communities to ensure that they maintained the control of project activities. About 70 percent of all project costs went directly into micro-projects.

3.12 *There is no evidence of elite capture or lack of women's participation*. Although these issues were not systematically tracked with specific indicators included in the MIS, they were monitored by the state agencies through field visits. The earlier ISRs mention concerns in relation to these issues, but also stress that State Agencies were aware of these problems and addressed them promptly.

[16] The IEG mission to the Ministry of Finance was unable to locate the office responsible for the CPRP. The official that was referenced by the project team as the responsible person was not knowledgeable of the CPRP and -was unable to locate any document related to the project.

[17] The weak implementation capacity of the NPC had been flagged as high risk since the first ISR. Bank's management recommended as early as May 2002 to monitor the situation closely and address it promptly, through restructuring or cancellation of the component.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION IMPLEMENTATION

3.13 *A standardized template of M&E indicators was set up only in the last 2-3 years of project implementation*. The ISRs indicate that the NPC was slow in setting up this system at the federal level, as well as in starting compiling and analyzing the information reported in the M&E framework of the State Agencies. This M&E framework for the entire project was eventually put in place at the end of 2003.

3.14 *State Agencies systematically tracked projects approved and implemented, infrastructure built, communication activities, and training provided*. The variables collected at the State Agency level centered mostly on type and quantity of infrastructure built, repaired, or rehabilitated (km of roads, number of culverts, number of classrooms by school level, number of health centers, quantity of furniture, number of dams, boreholes, hand pump wells, deep wells, public toilets, number of connections to national electricity grid or rural electrification projects, number of open/lock-up stalls, number of skill acquisition centers, etc.). State agencies also tracked the quantity of radio and TV program messages developed and aired, the number of newspaper advertisements, TV documentation and video production sponsored, and the number of sensitization workshops carried out at the LGA level. In terms of capacity building, State Agencies were tracking and reporting on the number of communities benefiting from training and the number of officers trained in workshops. The number of meetings of the agency (at board, management and staff level) was also regularly reported. The State agencies tracked also the number of monitoring field visits carried out and M&E reports produced, as well as any other monitoring product (such as impact studies).

3.15 *Some important variables were not collected*. There were no variables collected on frequency and attendance of community members in training and community development meetings and their composition (by sex, socio-economic characteristics, and so on), the number of organizations involved in decision-making and consultation, the number of person/days of labor contributed by the community members, gender empowerment measures (such as women's participation in decision-making, women trained in various activities, impact of development projects on women – women's time, women's income and savings, women's position in the community), the community level of usage of and satisfaction with the infrastructure provided (this variable was collected in the final impact assessment for a small sample of beneficiaries), the level of satisfaction with local service providers, the capacity of the community to maintain and repair the micro-projects and the arrangements to keep them functional.

3.16 *Poverty data were not collected in relation to the project*. A poverty mapping exercise that was meant to provide indication on how well the project was targeting poor communities was still underway in June 2003, when 182 projects had already been approved and many more were in the pipeline, according to ISRs. No poverty map or information about progress of this exercise was found for this evaluation.

3.17 Based on available national household surveys data, the states targeted were not necessarily the poorest, although data are available for 1996 and not 1999. Figure 3.1 shows that poverty levels in Abia, Ebonyi, Yobe, and Cross-River were not among the highest. Poverty rates were higher in Kebbi, Kwara, Kogi, and Ekiti. Figure 3.1 also shows that in

2010, when the project closed, only Cross-River and Ekiti had lower poverty rates than in 1996. In the other states, the rates were higher or unchanged.

Figure 3.1. Poverty Rates by State, 1996 and 2010



Source: NBS based on Consumer Expenditure Survey 1996; Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey 2010.

3.18 *A poverty survey was carried out, but not as part of the project activities*. A CWIQ survey was carried out by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2006 and a report was prepared presenting the results, but based on the documentation available it was not supported by the project. The Aide-Memoire of the supervision mission conducted in December 2005 mentions a plan to carry out the CWIQ survey and prepare a report for the development of a Poverty Monitoring framework by the NPC and the National Bureau of Statistics and indicates that "the mission made suggestions for accelerated implementation", but it does not provide any further detail. The documentation relative to the CWIQ survey was not included among the project documents or provided by the project team, but was retrieved by the IEG mission directly from the NBS.

3.19 *An impact assessment was conducted to assess the impacts of the project*. This impact assessment was prepared for the Federal Ministry of Finance by Sages Consult Ltd., a Nigeria consulting firm, based on a survey conducted during 4 weeks in March 2009. At the time of the survey some of the projects visited were not yet operational, although they had been completed or were close to completion. The analysis of the outcomes of the project is based on this impact assessment.

USE OF DATA

3.20 *State Agencies used M&E data to monitor the progress of the micro-projects*. Many GMs shared their M&E database with IEG. These databases show that the data on progress of the micro-projects were regularly updated. Some GMs continued to update the M&E database after project closed.—Abia State, for example, was able to report that as of June 2013 24 projects out of the 281 funded were not in use (some of which had never been fully completed).

3.21 Periodic workshops were carried out during which the GMs regularly shared their monitoring results.

3.22 The impact assessment conducted in March 2009 was regularly disseminated.

Safeguards Compliance

3.23 The project triggered the Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) requirement, and an Environmental and Social Management Framework was prepared and disclosed country wide.[18]

3.24 No significant safeguard issues were reported in the course of implementation and the IEG mission across any issues in the field. Environmental assessments of the micro-projects were carried out adequately—all the micro-projects were screened using the safeguard checklist to ensure conformity to the rules to prevent or mitigate possible environmental risks. An Environmental Performance Review of the project was undertaken in November 2003 and found very good compliance with the required environmental assessment procedures (ISR 12/10/2003). The project was adjudged highly satisfactory on environmental safeguards.

Fiduciary Issues

3.25 Supervision reports indicate that financial management supervision missions were conducted on a regular basis and no significant issues were detected. The supervision report of June 15, 2009, assigned a moderately satisfactory rating to financial management performance based on a final review showing that "the project was marginally satisfactory overall in view of the fact that issues such as delayed submission of statements of expenditures and documentation of advances persist till the end of the project". Up to that point the financial management performance was rated satisfactory. The ICR reports that there were no fiduciary issues or deviations from Bank policies and that Audited financial statements were received within the submission deadline and the audit opinion was unqualified. Procurement was rated satisfactory throughout implementation.

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[18] The project was classified category F (Financial Intermediary Assessment).

4. Achievement of the Objectives

Objective 1

"TO IMPROVE ACCESS OF THE POOR TO SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE"

4.1 Achievement of the first objective is rated **substantial**.

Outputs

4.2 ***Increased availability*** *of social and economic infrastructure has been achieved.* A much larger number of micro-projects[19] have been completed with respect to the target. The number of completed micro-projects was 2999. This number was well above the target of 2200 adopted with the additional financing. According to the ICR, the total number of micro-projects was much larger than estimated because the cost per project was lower than anticipated.

4.3 Overall, the completed micro-projects were mostly for infrastructure in education (1119 or 37 percent of total number, 41 percent of total disbursement—see Figure 4.1), water supply (925 or 31 percent of total number, 19 percent of disbursement—see Figure 4.3), health (303 or 10 percent of total number, 11 percent of total disbursement), and feeder roads and bridges (277 or 9 percent of total number, 13 percent of total disbursement). The distribution of micro-projects across sectors varied across states (as shown in Figure 4.4), which reflects different priorities of the communities (in Abia, for example, the largest group of micro-projects, or 34 percent of the total number, were for rural electricity; in Cross River 67 percent were sanitation projects). Ebonyi and Kwara joined the project in 2005 and had a much smaller number of completed micro-projects than the other states.

[19] Each micro-project was a piece of social infrastructure, such as boreholes, classrooms, health centers, rural electrification projects (essentially connections to main grid), small bridges, culverts, etc.

Figure 4.1. Chemistry Lab in Kwara State

Source: © 2013 Elena Bardasi.

Figure 4.2. Water Project in Kwara State

Source: © 2013 Elena Bardasi.

4.4 More specifically, the project supported the construction and rehabilitation of 277 roads for a total of 598 km of new road (of which 355 km under construction when the ICR was completed) and 2,699 km of roads rehabilitated; 2449 primary classrooms were constructed (and 372 were rehabilitated. An additional 252 were still under construction during the last supervision visit and 118 under rehabilitation); 664 secondary classrooms were constructed (and 164 were rehabilitated. An additional 305 were still under construction during the last supervision visit and 91 under rehabilitation); 1833 items of teaching aids were purchased; 137,236 items of school furniture were purchased; 228 health centers/clinics were constructed (and an additional 21 were under construction and 35 were rehabilitated); 3328 items of medical aids were purchased; 261 boreholes, 479 deep wells, and 412 hand pump wells were sunk; 41 electricity projects were implemented; 192 generating sets were purchased.

Figure 4.3. Number of Completed Micro-projects by Type and State



Source: IEG calculation based on data reported in the project ICR.

4.5 *The new infrastructure created by the project was* ***sustainable*** *at acceptable levels.* Out of the 2,999 completed micro-projects, 2,759 (92 percent) were still being maintained one year after completion. This is below the implicit target of 100 percent set up in the PAD and reiterated at additional financing (the target of 2,200 micro-projects was defined for "micro-projects operational one year after completion"—i.e., all projects were supposed to be sustainable at the one year mark). That said, the risk of project "failure" cannot be reduced to zero (a borehole can dry out, a piece of equipment can fail, maintenance of the infrastructure may be impossible contrary to all best predictions). Therefore 92 percent can be considered an acceptable record.

4.6 *A very high percentage of micro-projects were still* ***operational 4 years after completion*** *(i.e. at the time this evaluation was carried out).* One of the main goals of this evaluation was to assess to what extent the infrastructure created by the project was still functional and maintained 4 years after completion of the project. This percentage was very similar to the percentage of micro-projects maintained and functional at the 1 year mark. Based on the responses given by GMs to a questionnaire prepared for this evaluation, 91 percent of all micro-projects in Abia, more than 90 percent in Cross River, 99-100 percent in Kwara, and 95 percent in Yobe were still operational in June 2013.[20] Fields visits conducted for this evaluation found that in Kwara State, 17 out of 17 of the micro-projects visited were still operational and maintained by the communities. In one case, termites had damaged the furniture of one of the classrooms constructed by the project, but the classroom was fully operational and used for physics lessons. In another two cases, the pump and the tank of two boreholes were damaged, but promptly repaired as soon as the community was able to collect the required amount of money.

4.7 *Communities were able to design maintenance plans for repairing and maintaining the infrastructure*, which explains the large percentage of micro-projects being maintained. In Kwara, every community visited had specific (and in some cases very unique and original) savings plans and maintenance arrangements reflecting the characteristics and livelihood strategy of the community, and their ability to pay. The communities visited proved to be able to enforce their maintenance plans.

4.8 In the case of Yobe State, audit visits to CPRP infrastructure are still carried out by the CSDP Internal Auditor and Financial Monitoring Unit.[21] As shown by the documentation provided by the GM of the Yobe State Agency, the results of audit visits conducted to three senatorial districts of the State during 8-15 May, 2013 indicate that 11 out of 11 CPRP micro-projects are in use and fully functional (the report indicates that, in some cases, additions to the original micro-projects were carried out).

Outcomes

4.9 *Increased* ***access*** *to social and economic infrastructure has been achieved*. In the 8 states supported by the CPRP, 3085 communities[22] (accounting for about 10.3 million residents) benefited directly or indirectly from as many micro-projects.

4.10 *Increased access of* ***poor communities*** *to social and economic infrastructures has likely been achieved, although no hard evidence is available.* Neither the ICR nor the impact assessment commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Finance specify whether the 3085 communities reached were disproportionately the poorest ones.

4.11 *The community poverty level was not one of the criteria used to select applications*. According to the responses of the GMs of the State Agencies to a questionnaire prepared for this evaluation, all or almost all LGAs in each state were reached by the project, but the participation of individual communities within the state was not universal. The likelihood of

[20] These are figures reported by GM that could not be verified against M&E data. Abia State was the only one that provided an updated M&E dataset.
[21] Information on whether this happens also in other States is lacking.
[22] This is the number of communities where a micro-project was in use by the end of the project. Some micro-projects were approved but not completed, but some of the micro-projects that were not completed were operational albeit at a reduced capacity. Only one micro-project per community was allowed for funding.

a community having a micro-project funded by the project depended on (i) the knowledge of the project, (ii) the quality of the application, (iii) the probability of the application being selected for funding, and (iv) the likelihood of implementing the micro-project if selected. All these elements are likely to favor better-off communities, which normally can rely on migrants in Abuja, Lagos, and other main cities to transmit information about the project to their community, help preparing successful applications, and procure skilled technicians for the necessary assessment, planning, and execution of micro-project. Besides tracking the number of programs aired by TV and radio, advertisements published in newspapers, LGA sensitization workshops, and visits to communities, the MIS does not provide any information on the correlation between the well-being of a community and the funding of a micro-project. Based on field observations and interviews carried out in Kwara, prioritization of poor communities was not the first/main targeting criteria. Visits to communities, plausibly the most effective way to gain the trust of the population and explain the features of the project, were numerous, but were not necessarily targeted to the poorest communities, which were the most difficult (and expensive) to reach. There is evidence of State Agencies following the guidelines in selecting projects (exclusion of income-generating activities; requirement of matching funds from the community; etc.), but not of selecting projects based on the poverty level of the community (socio-economic indicators were not available to assist in this task). The selection criteria used to select the applications for desk reviews and field visits,[23] as well as for funding cannot be verified because the state Management Information Systems does not include the necessary indicators, especially for projects that were not selected.[24]

4.12 *The number of micro-projects and the percentage of the total population that was reached by the project was large enough to suggest that poor communities were indeed included, even in absence of indicators tracking the poverty level of those communities.* Three GMs were able to provide an estimate of the percentage of the population of the state residing in communities with approved micro-projects—more than 50 percent in Cross River, about 42 percent in Yobe, 25 percent in Ebonyi. Considering that the project only targeted rural areas, poor communities must have been largely included. The impact assessment commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Finance noticed, based on observations from the assessment team, that "…the CPRP was introduced in all the 8 states to most remote corners of the states, where the LGAs and the state governments have not been very active in project implementation in the past. In some LGAs in Kogi, the CPRP was considered the only government organ that was in touch with the communities" (p. 17).

4.13 ***Within each community, access of the poor*** *to social and economic infrastructure was likely guaranteed.* The ICR does not discuss to what extent the micro-projects benefited the poor within a community, and whether there were issues of elite capture. Early ISRs mention that concerns about elite capture existed during the initial stages of project implementation, but indicate that this issue was discussed and resolved. Even though detailed

[23] Not all applications were followed up with desk reviews and field visits. Following 8314 applications received, 4755 desk appraisals and 4203 field appraisals were conducted.

[24] Several GMs provided the original MIS for this evaluation. The list of applications that were not funded is sometimes included, but often without any indication of the sector and type of application, amount requested, and other relevant information. Out of 8314 applications for micro-projects received 38 percent were funded. The rate of approval varied a lot across states—the lowest was in Kwara (only 20 percent of projects approved), the maximum in Kebbi (68 percent of projects approved) (Final Supervision Report, June 2009).

information is lacking on this specific point, education, health, and water supply projects are known to be more pro-poor than other types of projects (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). Moreover, conversations with community representatives during IEG field visits to Kwara indicate that everybody in every community interviewed was given access to schools, water points, or health clinics irrespective of their ability to contribute to the micro-project and pay for its maintenance.

4.14 *The **well-being of the poor** has likely increased as a consequence of increased access to social and economic infrastructure.* The impact assessment carried out in March 2009 used a beneficiary assessment to measure the impacts of different types of micro-projects (education, transportation, health, water and sanitation, electrification) on quantitative indicators of well-being. Unfortunately, the response rate was very low (18 percent for all sectors combined) and likely biased (the response rate was probably not randomly distributed, although there are no elements to gauge in which direction the bias may have gone). In addition to quantitative indicators, subjective perceptions were also collected (in the form of agreeing or disagreeing that the projects produced benefits in a number of dimensions), which generated a much higher response rate (generally above 90 percent). Both sets of data—with their respective limitations—indicate that the impacts were very positive, as noted below.

4.15 *Construction and rehabilitation of rural roads determined a decrease in commuting time, a reduced incidence of flooding along the roads, and an increase in farm produce marketed, based on a comparison before/after the project.* In Ebonyi State average commuting time decreased from 75 to 24 minutes (data from 4 communities). In the 8 States (data from 22 communities) the number of vehicles increased from 209 to 719 per day (a remarkable increase occurred in Kogi, from 27 vehicles a day to 355 after project execution). Farm produce marketed increased from 28 percent (of farm production) to 68 percent in the 22 communities with transportation projects. When asked about subjective perceptions, an extremely large percentage of beneficiaries of rural roads (between 86 percent and 96 percent) found that the construction or rehabilitation of rural roads reduced travel commuting time, increased vehicular traffic, increased commercial activities, reduced transportation costs, and increased farm produce marketed.

4.16 *The number of people using the health centers has increased, based on the impact assessment, although no improvements are perceived in several dimensions based on the individual perceptions data.* Quantitative data from the beneficiary assessment indicate that in 6 states the number of people attending health facilities increased more than six-fold, deaths from diseases fell substantially, and availability of drugs increased (the usual caveat regarding the very small response rate applies). However, based on subjective perceptions, there were no improvements in the availability of doctors (including presence of female doctors), and in electricity and water supply. The one health clinic visited in Kwara for this evaluation was connected with the main road through a secondary road in extremely bad conditions, which made accessibility really difficult. The number of patients arriving at the clinic each day was very low (4-5, as reported by the staff of 7).

4.17 *Access to social and economic infrastructure was equitable by **gender** and in some cases disproportionately beneficial to women.* Thanks to increased water access, the average time women spend fetching water greatly decreased. The few quantitative data available indicate an 83 percent decrease in the number of minutes spent per day (from 95.7 to 16.4 minutes), and a strong decrease (-74 percent) in the cases of water-borne diseases as well. Associated with these improvements are a decrease in costs spent on water and a decrease in the number of women and children involved in water collection—see Figure 4.3. The benefits of water projects were immediately obvious from IEG observations on the ground. In Kwara, all water projects visited were strongly supported by the whole community (not only women), which established clear plans to raise money for maintenance and repairs. A borehole normally served 3-4 distribution points, which catered to the whole community and whose access was highly regulated to maximize benefits for all.

Figure 4.4. Woman Fetching Water at a CPRP Water Distribution Point, Kwara State

Source: © 2013 Elena Bardasi.

4.18 *Some of the micro-projects—more specifically, water projects—may have been disproportionately beneficial to women, even if there is no hard count demonstrating that the project reached the target of 70 percent of all beneficiaries being women*. Evidence from the empirical literature indicates that water projects (drilling a borehole in a community that was previously relying on a river, or a well, or a distant source of water) directly benefit women who do not need any more to walk long distances to fetch water and can, in addition, benefit for better quality water. No specific data has been collected by the project on how women's lives have been affected (in terms of time use, use and quality of water, etc.). The ICR reports that the target of 70 percent of all project beneficiaries being women was achieved based on the results of the Impact Assessment. The ICR does not show how the 70 percent was calculated, but a figure close to 70 percent is obtained if all water projects are 'assigned to women' and the remaining projects are 'equally assigned' to men and women (i.e. for water projects women are given a weight of 1 and men 0 weight, and for the rest men and women are given a weight of 0.5 each). Claiming that water projects are only beneficial to women is obviously exaggerated, but even superficial observations reveal that a water point in a community drastically changes the life of women more than anybody else's.

Division of roles between men and women in managing project infrastructure

One community visited in Kwara State provides a very good example of clear division of roles and responsibilities between men and women in managing the infrastructure created by the project. Water was identified as the priority—which responded to women's needs. Men paid the community contribution corresponding to 10 percent of the total cost of the borehole. At the time of IEG visit, the community indicated that their top priority was a generator to operate the pump during the electricity breaks down. Men claimed that this was the women's responsibility, given that the men had paid the contribution to the infrastructure and were also regularly paying school fees for their children. The women were already saving toward the generator and declared that the day after they would have gone to the market to sell the crops and use the money obtained to buy the generator. (In that community, both men and women were growing cash crops in a collaborative way. At gathering, men were selling all crops to women for final sale on the market —thus transferring the risk to the women, but also the potential larger gains to be made in the market).

4.19 *The number of students enrolled in primary education (boys and girls) increased.* Based on the very small sample of beneficiaries of education projects (75 individuals/ households that provided data out of the 321 interviewed across 8 states) there was an increase in enrollment of 63 percent. The impact assessment does not provide data disaggregated by school level, but it disaggregates by sex—the increase was 61 percent for girls and 64 percent for boys, thus the proportion of girls in school very mildly decreased.[25] Truancy rates decreased on average from 41 percent to 11 percent. Based on subjective perceptions (about 280 valid responses across 8 states), the greatest success were—besides increased student enrolment—increased students and teacher motivation, and reduced drop outs.[26] In agreement with findings reported in the impact assessment for other States, in Kwara there were no problems in staffing schools with additional teachers, largely because the project funded new classrooms (or rehabilitation of existing classrooms) rather than new schools. When the number of students increased as a result of additional/newer/better classrooms the LGA was prompt in making additional teachers available.

[25] According to ISRs (e.g. ISR #10, 05/16/2005) some communities experienced also a strong increase in the number of girls attending schools, especially in primary school classes.

[26] Beneficiaries of education projects also reported that they felt the project was successful in increasing the number of girls in school (95 percent in agreement), which is true in absolute number, but not in relative terms.

4.20 *The quality of education likely increased.* Observations from Kwara State indicate that in addition to an impact on enrolment there were also impacts on class size and on the type of subjects taught in school (especially for secondary education schools). New labs gave the school the possibility to teach subjects previously not included in the curricula, such as chemistry, biology, and physics. As a results, students that may have previously moved to a more distant school or given up their aspirations were retained in the school closer to their residence. Moreover, classes that would otherwise be in the open moved into new classrooms. In this sense, even where the project did not produce a substantial increase in enrolment, it did produce an increase in the quality of school conditions and in the variety of courses offered.

4.21 *School attendance grew faster in CPRP States than in non-CPRP States, based on data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for 1999, 2003, and 2008*. In 1999, according to DHS data, in the 8 intervention states combined school attendance was about 66 percent, higher than in the remaining "control" states (where it was about 64 percent – see Figure 4.5, bottom line). Over the life of the project, education attendance increased faster in intervention states (top line), suggesting that the project as a whole, especially in its initial phase, may have had a positive impact.[27] Figure 4.5 raises a question about targeting, though. The CPRP was supposed to target the poorest States (where education indicators were plausibly worse). This, however, does not appear to have been the case, at least with respect to education indicators.

Figure 4.5. Variations in Education Attendance in Project and Non-project States



Calculations based on DHS for three years (1999, 2003, and 2008). 'Intervention States' are the states were the project was implemented, 'control States' were the remaining Nigerian states.
Source: IEG calculations.

[27] The two sets of states are different with respect to a number of other characteristics besides receiving the project, so the comparison should be made with caution.

Objective 2

"TO INCREASE THE AVAILABILITY AND MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL"

4.22 Achievement of the second objective is rated **modest**.

Outputs

4.23 *State Agencies and other implementation arrangements were put in place*. The State Agencies for the project were promptly set up in the initial stage of the project. The competencies of the GMs and the staff of the State Agencies proved to be extremely high. The impact assessment commissioned by the Ministry of Finance noticed that "the General Managers and all the staff involved in the structure and implementation of the projects were all knowledge workers with total commitment to the ideals of the CPRP. […] In some states such as Kogi, even the drivers or the Agencies were able to accentuate and communicate the project ideology to the consultants [carrying out the impact assessment] and had very useful insights into project components, success and failure risk factors…" (p. 20-21). These observations are in complete agreement with the evidence collected for this evaluation. First, all GMs and a large part of the staff of the CPRP were confirmed in their role in the follow-up project, the CSDP, based on their CPRP performance. Second, almost all GMs were very responsive in providing material for this evaluation. Third, in Kwara state every community visited—sometimes unexpectedly—showed great familiarity with and gratitude towards the project staff, which was always warmly welcomed.

4.24 *More than 3000 communities participated in the process* of identifying community needs, preparing proposals for funding, and implementing micro-projects.

4.25 *More than 3000 community-based organizations received training* to build skills in managing funds and procuring goods and services for the implementation of micro-projects. About 150 staff were trained and about 200 workshops were organized.

Outcomes

4.26 *Funding controlled by poor communities increased.* The project transferred US$59.83 million to poor communities, which was lower than the target of more than US$70 million (Table 3.1) and contradicted the justification for additional financing. The ICR Review reports that, based on information provided by the project team, "state- and local government-level counterpart funding was waived upon agreement with the Bank after changes in the Country Financing Parameters, which allowed 100 percent financing in all categories." This means that "development resources" were made available to communities exclusively by the project; there was no channeling of funds from the government to communities. Communities matched project funds with their own contribution, according to project design. Their ability to manage funds increased, as demonstrated by the number of micro-projects successfully completed and maintained.

4.27 *The project does not appear to have succeeded in creating strong and lasting* ***linkages between government and local communities, especially at the LGA level***. While the PAD stressed the need for the community-driven development approach to be embraced by the government at different levels, and included a component aimed to strengthen government capacity in this respect, no substantial results have actually been achieved. At the community level, the LGAs were not much involved in the selection and monitoring of micro-projects as originally envisaged. According to the impact assessment, the State Agencies were wary of the LGAs hijacking the project and trying to use the project funding for other purposes. Based on the observations conducted for this evaluation, the capacity of the LGAs was indeed very low and the Community Development Officers—based in (and employed by) the LGAs—identify themselves more with the State Agency than the LGA. The impact assessment noticed (and this evaluation agrees with that analysis) that the lack of integration of the LGAs into the project is counterproductive, because the LGAs need to provide staff and support to schools and health centers built or re-habilitated through the project. Field visits to the Kwara micro-projects indicate that communities may need to rely on LGAs for repairs of the community infrastructure. Even if the LGA budget for this purpose is generally very small,[28] improving the connection between the infrastructure created through the project and the LGA capacity of supporting its maintenance would be beneficial and in the long run could help to institutionalize the CDD approach. Finally, a better coordination between the LGA and the communities could prevent duplication of efforts (in a community visited in Kwara, two boreholes were operating side by side, one funded by the project, one by the LGA), and ensure complementarities instead.

4.28 *Women may have benefited from the project not only as direct beneficiaries, but also in terms of increased decision-making power within the community*. Based on the PAD, women were meant to benefit in terms of increased empowerment and standing in the community from being involved in the decision-making process through which sub-projects were selected for proposals. Many GMs reported that women were members of the Project Implementation Committees, were actively involved in the needs assessment and the selection of micro-projects, and were treasurers in almost all the communities Project Management Committee. Moreover, women's associations directly sponsored micro-projects in all states. While the PAD mentions that a participatory monitoring and evaluation approach was to capture the participatory process in community decision-making, these data were not collected; however, the follow-up project to the CPRP includes variables in the monitoring framework to quantitatively assess the participation of women in the project and the benefits going to women. Visits to Kwara state indicate that women were indeed involved in the selection of micro-projects and sometimes were the driving force behind the proposals, with variations across communities.

4.29 *There is only mild evidence of an increased number of federally supported programs using community-based initiatives or increased number and quality of community-based activities undertaken by States.* The ICR reports that during the course of the project the federal, state, and local institutions had the opportunity to appreciate and, in some cases, adopt the community-based development approach. According to the ICR, some LGAs used the project concept of their own initiative; the State of Yobe started similar projects and allocated a budget of N 2.0 million per month to each political ward to spend on priority projects locally determined; many communities that did not receive funding by the project started similar projects with their own funding; and some Ministries and Development

[28] The one Kwara LGA visited for this evaluation allocates N. 200,000 a year for maintenance of community infrastructure and the procedure to access this funding is long and extremely cumbersome.

Agencies partnered with the State Agencies to use a CDD approach to start their own projects (especially in water supply). These impacts, though, were not systematic and, oddly enough, the ICR reports them under 'other outcomes' (or even 'unintended outcomes'). However, the involvement of the Federal government and the States and their 'buy-in' of the CDD philosophy was a planned intermediate outcome with performance indicators attached, rather than a more occasional and incidental outcome.

5. Efficiency

5.1 Efficiency is rated **substantial**. There is limited evidence on efficiency, but this is partly due to the difficulties to calculate ex-ante standard efficiency measures for projects yet to be defined. There is evidence that classrooms in Kwara (Table 5.1 below) and other micro-projects elsewhere (World Bank 2009, Table 1, p. 88) were more cost-effective than comparable infrastructure provided by the government.

5.2 *The PAD does not include any efficiency analysis*, due to the difficulties of calculating formal efficiency measures – such as the economic rate of return – without knowing the types of micro-projects that communities were going to select. Efficiency is discussed in the PAD with respect to the efficiency of the individual micro-projects—to be assessed as part of the micro-project selection and defined as *cost per beneficiary* and *cost per unit delivered*. According to the PAD, the State Agency staff (in conjunction with relevant LGA authorities) was assigned the responsibility to assess *ex-ante* (during desk and field review) whether the proposal had chosen the most cost-effective means of meeting the objective of the micro-project. No information is available on whether and how this rule was systematically followed. However, the evidence for Kwara indicates that (i) substantial cost savings were achieved for (ii) infrastructure that was found to be in overall good conditions.

5.3 *The ICR does not include any efficiency analysis and does not report much information on how the assessment of efficiency was carried out for each individual micro-project*. An (aggregate) cost effectiveness analysis was carried out as part of the Mid-Term review 2004 and also as part of the Impact Assessment 2009, using a number of indicators that were included in the MIS, including the number of beneficiaries, the cost per beneficiary, and the cost per unit delivered.[29] Based on these studies—which also considered the quality of the infrastructure—the CPRP was about 26 percent more cost effective than similar alternative government agency projects for micro-projects of the same specification. These studies also stressed that the CPRP generally used higher quality materials and better construction methods.

5.4 In Kwara State efficiency gains from the CPRP may have been even higher. Based on IEG calculations using data provided by the Desk Officer of the Ministry of Education of Kwara State and M&E data of the CPRP, education infrastructure built by the project was about 57 percent to 42 percent cheaper—see Table 5.1. The infrastructure is not perfectly comparable, given that the materials used by the government are typically more expensive.

[29] IEG was unable to locate the Mid-Term review of the CPRP, but a summary of the main findings on efficiency is included in the PAD of the Community and Social Development Project, follow-up to the CPRP (Annex 9).

For example, long span aluminum roofing sheet is used in government constructions instead of galvanized iron roofing sheet, terrazo floor finishing instead of screeding (a mixture of cement and sand), and PVC ceiling instead of asbestos ceiling boards.

5.5 The ICR also highlights that the CPRP may have fostered greater allocative efficiency, given that limited resources were directed towards the investments considered more useful by the local communities, thus maximizing the marginal utility.

Table 5.1. Cost Comparison of Education CPRP Micro-projects with Similar Government Infrastructure, Kwara State

Type of infrastructure	Government (Naira 2010)	CPRP (Naira 2007)	Government (US$ 2010)	CPRP (US$ 2010)	CPRP/ Gov.
Block of two classrooms, furnished, plus 1 office	7,000,000	2,086,000	41,176	18,283	0.44
Block of three classrooms*	7,500,000	3,400,000	44,118	29,797	0.68
Block of two classrooms**	5,500,000	2,200,000	32,353	19,280	0.60
Labs: two rooms with furniture and equipment	10,500,000	3,000,000	61,765	26,291	0.43

Source: IEG calculations. Government figures provided by the Desk Officer of the Ministry of Education of Kwara State. CPRP figures derived from the M&E dataset of Kwara State.
* Government: unfurnished; CPRP: furnished plus an office.
** Government: unfurnished; CPRP: furnished.

6. Ratings

Outcome

6.1 Outcome is rated **moderately satisfactory.** This is based on substantial Relevance of Objectives; modest Relevance of Design; substantial achievement of the objective to improve access to the poor of social and economic infrastructure, and modest achievement of the objective to increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level. Efficiency was substantial. The project proved successful in creating micro-projects that increase access of the poor population to social and economic infrastructure. The project was not very successful in institutionalizing the community-based development approach—by the end of the project the communities had grown in their ability of identifying, proposing, and managing micro-projects responding to their needs, but the government had not embraced the approach as a way of channeling resources for effective poverty reduction. The project established a synergy between communities and State Agencies based on a transfer of funds and training to support micro-projects, but a similar relationship was not established with the government at the local, state, or federal level.

Risk to Development Outcome

6.2 The risk to development outcome is rated **Moderate**.

6.3 Sustainability of the infrastructure created by the project remains one of the main threats to the achievements of the project. Four years after the end of the project, an estimated 90 percent (or more) of the micro-projects built were operational and well maintained. Communities had plans in place to contribute to maintenance funds to ensure repairs and improvements of micro-projects. Four years is still a relatively short period into the life of the infrastructure created by the project, though, and there are risks related to longer term maintenance. In this respect, the LGAs and the States have an important role to play; it is not realistic to expect local communities to take full responsibility of the infrastructure built by the project, not only when it comes to maintenance but also in relation to its 'operationalization' (schools need teachers, health centers need doctors and nurses, rural electrification projects need a properly functioning main grid, and so on).

6.4 Institutional sustainability is also crucial. The CPRP did not achieve the objective of institutionalizing the community-based development approach, but it was followed by the CSDP – an improved community-based development project aiming to continue and consolidate the efforts of the CPRP. An indefinite sequence of aid-funded CDD projects is not the optimal answer. Ideally, the government should incorporate the approach into its menu of poverty reduction strategies and, where appropriate, work with communities to provide the infrastructure most needed at the local level in an efficient way. The CSDP aims to strengthen the relationship between communities and the government at different levels by requiring matching funds from the government and a stricter collaboration.

Bank Performance

6.5 Bank performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory.**

Quality at Entry

6.6 Quality at entry is rated as **Moderately Satisfactory.**

6.7 Project preparation was thorough and the growing of experience of the Bank in social funds was used in project design. While new for Nigeria, the design of the project was based on the social fund model that had been already implemented in other African countries. The design incorporated lessons from other Sub-Saharan African countries that had already implemented a participatory approach, such as Zambia and Malawi. A team from the Poverty Alleviation Programme Development Committee of the NPC visited both the Zambia and Malawi social funds projects to develop the CPRP.

6.8 Lessons on what worked best in community-based development projects were incorporated into the design, in particular the requirement of cash and in-kind contributions from communities in order to increase the level of ownership and commitment vis-à-vis the micro-projects built by the project; the adoption of flexible and simple procurement and disbursement requirements; the choice of an approach ensuring administrative autonomy in a context where the government was not entirely ready to embrace the community-based approach across the board and the level of trust between communities and government was low.

6.9 An under-developed results chain resulted in insufficient project preparation of some key aspects. For example, the role of the NPC was not fully spelled out, and a thorough assessment of its limitations and training needs was not carried out. The financial allocation to the capacity building component was significantly underestimated even though project management by the NPC was considered high risk and in need of improvement.. Later on, the allocation to capacity building activities had to be substantially scaled up, and the project had to be moved to the Ministry of Finance.

6.10 Another important limitation was an excessively undefined M&E framework. One of the key elements of the project was participation by communities in the identification, proposal, and implementation of micro-projects. In the project preparation stage, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were part of stakeholder workshops analyzing approaches to poverty reduction in Nigeria. Social and institutional assessments were also carried out to determine the capacity of NGOs to participate in the project. Yet, the project did not include in its monitoring framework measures of the level of participation by civil society, which confines the evidence on the success of the participatory framework to the anecdotal level.

6.11 The States were included in the project preparation and supervision processes, more than the LGAs. Desk officers from State line ministries were involved in assessing proposals for micro-projects.

Quality of Supervision

6.12 Quality of supervision is rated as **Satisfactory.**

6.13 The Bank carried regular supervision missions. The transfer of the task team leadership to the field further strengthened the supervision function. The fact that the new task team leader had been part of the project team since the beginning and remained in place until the end of the project ensured continuity and institutional memory. This came, however, at the expenses of more frequent supervision missions from the World Bank headquarters. The borrower's comments to the ICR stress that, albeit "the World Bank performed credibly above average (…) supervision was not enough" (ICR, p. 73). More details are not provided on the reasons and consequences of the perceived shortcoming in Bank's supervision.

6.14 The Bank project team promptly signaled in the ISRs implementation issues. The concerns related to the weak capacity of the NPC were discussed in the early ISRs and concrete solutions were proposed to resolve them (in this specific case, the project team proposed clearly defined steps and deadlines to be met by the NPC, although this probably did not happen as promptly as it could have been, as previously discussed). The ISRs were overly generous in rating some aspects of the project (the M&E was consistently given a 'Satisfactory' rating except for one 'Unsatisfactory'; the capacity building component was also 'Satisfactory' in all ISRs except two 'Unsatisfactory' ones).

Borrower Performance

6.15 Government Performance is rated as **Moderately Satisfactory**.

6.16 At the federal level, the government demonstrated to be willing to commit to the community-based development approach. The government strategies speak of the importance of involving the poor in the design and implementation of projects, and in formulating and managing poverty reduction programs. In reality, the capacity of the government was very weak, and its ability to collect and analyze poverty data limited. There is no substantial evidence of increased administrative capacity at the central level in relation to 'internalizing' and implementing a CDD approach. There is also no evidence of increased coordination between the NPC (or the Ministry of Finance) and the Federal Office of Statistics for the production of poverty studies in relation to the project (besides the Impact Assessment contracted out by the Ministry of Finance).

6.17 At the State level, State government also expressed willingness to participate in the project and to co-finance project activities. The States financed and organized a set of activities during project preparation, including social and institutional assessments; however, they were successively unable to meet their budgetary commitments and counterpart funding was eventually waived.

6.18 The LGAs performance was particularly weak. The impact assessment comments that in the majority of the participating states "there seemed to be complete alienation of the LGs from the CPRP process (…) the Assessment Team could not draw an organogram with a slot for the LGA even as a monitoring agent" (p. 21). While poor capacity and limited resources explain the inability of the LGAs to play a meaningful role in the project, the impact assessment also refers to the widespread opinion that the LGAs would hijack the project and divert project funds to other uses.

6.19 Fiduciary matters were properly carried out. According to the PAD "… appropriate levels of review and approval were usually in place; financial accountability and follow-up was observed, and expenditures were duly authorized before they were incurred. Documentation was maintained properly for periodic review." (ICR, p. 21).

6.20 Implementing Agency Performance is rated as **Satisfactory**.

6.21 The project documents stress that frequent personnel changes at the NPC and other institutional problems contributed to a very slow start of implementation. While Bank's responsibilities may also account for some of these issues (too little investment in capacity building), the NPC was definitely slow in accomplishing a number of commitments agreed with the Bank. The project implementation unit was later moved to the Ministry of Finance and implementation became smoother, although—as previously discussed—this was not the optimal choice to ensure institutional sustainability.

6.22 The GMs and the staff of the State Agencies demonstrated to be highly skilled professionals very committed to the project and its philosophy. The impact assessment found that safeguards were put in place and the rules of accessing funds were strictly adhered to. M&E data were regularly collected, updated, and shared with the government and the project team. Outreach to communities was regularly undertaken, as well as supervision of micro-projects. Fiduciary performance was satisfactory. The IEG field visit to Kwara State confirms that the dynamism of that State Agency importantly contributed to the success of the project on the ground.

Monitoring and evaluation

6.23 Overall, the quality of M&E is rated ***modest***.

6.24 Design of M&E was particularly weak. Outcome indicators were not included. A well-defined M&E system did not exist at project appraisal stage and the PAD was vague on the roles and responsibilities of the state agencies and the government (federal, state, and local) in collecting, reporting, and using monitoring data. Baseline data did not exist at project approval.

6.25 The project MIS was established with substantial delays. The State Agencies regularly collected data on the type and quantity of infrastructure built and rehabilitated, training provided, and communication activities undertaken. However, no data on community participation was collected. Data on poverty were not collected, either to assess proper targeting or to measure impacts.

The data collected were used to monitor implementation and track the status of the infrastructure. Data were shared in workshops and periodic meetings of the State Agencies personnel. The impact assessment was regularly disseminated.

7. Lessons

7.1 The IEG Nigeria Country Assistance Evaluation 1998-2007 (2010) found that CDD programs had created a process within communities for weighing priorities for development and had led to short-term income gains. That IEG report noted that stronger links with the local governments and state ministries had to be developed to make these achievements sustainable and ensuring they would contribute to better social service outcomes.

7.2 The findings of this report fully confirm that intuition. The CPRP was successful in generating much enthusiasm for the community-based development approach, especially at the community level. The CPRP enabled and empowered communities to identify their main development needs, prepare proposals for social and economic infrastructure, and manage micro-projects. Under the project a large number of micro-projects were realized, many more (and each about half the size) than planned at appraisal. Yet, the project was not as successful in creating the necessary links between communities and local government and state ministries to institutionalize the approach and integrate it into broader poverty reduction policies.

7.3 Based on the experience of the project, several lessons can be drawn:

7.4 ***A problem as complex and ambitious as poverty reduction cannot be tackled unilaterally by community initiatives but needs to be integrated in and coordinated with the broader poverty reduction strategy of the government***. The PAD of the CSDP—the follow-up project to the CPRP—comments, “Despite the overall success of CPRP, it is acknowledged that the impact of the project on poverty would have been more profound if there had been greater collaboration and partnership of the communities with their Local Government Authorities and active support of the relevant sectoral ministries” (CSDP PAD, p. 15). This requires a strong capacity building effort to develop the analytical and managerial capacity at the Federal, State, LGA, and community levels, to identify the needs of the poor, propose potential solutions and evaluate the effectiveness of interventions in sectors that are important for enhancing the well-being of the poor.

7.5 ***For the micro-projects to be sustainable in the long-run, the community-based development approach needs to engender and nurture a strong relationship between the local communities and the government at all levels.*** The collaboration between communities and local government is crucial not only to achieve poverty reduction, but also for *functional* reasons, that is to:

(i) guarantee financial sustainability. Financial sustainability requires that micro-projects rely on a more stable financial basis than community contributions (especially of poor communities) for maintenance and expansion. It also requires buy-in of the approach by the government, so that resources from the federal, state, and local budget are allocated to community-based development projects whenever this is identified as the most appropriate approach;

(ii) ensure the integration of the community-built infrastructure with the (larger) state and government infrastructure.

7.6 ***Development projects (including community-development projects) need to be coherent and complementary in the larger picture.*** This complementarity can originate within the project itself (the CSDP replaced the 1-project per community rule with the project *plan* per community), through harmonization across different projects (as required by the Country Partnership Strategy 2005-2009), and/or through the coordination between the CDD approach and the government provision. This latter approach would also produce institutional strengthening as an additional benefit. It is futile to construct or rehabilitate a clinic if it is not easily accessible, supplied with water and electricity, and adequately staffed.

7.7 ***The M&E framework is especially crucial for community-based development projects.*** The CPRP is an example of project that was likely more successful than the M&E data can possibly tell. A number of key indicators were regularly collected and heavily used by State Agencies to carry out desk and field assessments of proposals, as well as the selection and funding of micro-projects and to monitor the realization of the community infrastructure, but very little was collected as far as the targeting, the participatory process, and the impacts on the well-being of the communities was concerned. This lack of information, besides preventing a full evaluation of the achievements of the project, also limits a deep understanding of all the mechanisms that may enhance or weaken the CDD approach. In the specific case of the CPRP, for example, there is no clear evidence of *how* the poor were reached and the empowerment *process* that led them learn to identify and act upon their needs. Collecting timely information, including baseline data, to inform the design and implementation of CDD projects is also crucial.

7.8 ***Community-development projects, when properly designed, have the potential of addressing the needs of community members that are traditionally marginalized or not adequately represented***. There is evidence, although not hard quantitative evidence, that women's needs were properly represented in the selection of CPRP micro-projects. A constant effort was made (as documented by the ISRs) to ensure that women were included in community decision-making and women's associations were encouraged to present proposals of their own. Moreover, the type of projects allowed for funding by the CPRP was especially pro-poor and generally managed in an inclusive way.

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Annex A. Basic Data Sheet

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA - COMMUNITY BASED POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECT (P069086)

Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million)

	Appraisal estimate	Actual or current estimate	Actual as % of appraisal estimate
Total project costs	96.36	93.96	97.50
Loan amount	60.00*	67.96	113.26
Additional Financing (IDA)	26.06	25.90	96.85
Cancellation (IDA)	0.00	0.16	0.00

*Additional financing of $25m made by IDA - explaining the difference between Appraisal estimate and Actual for IDA

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	FY01	*FY02*	*FY03*	*FY04*	*FY05*	*FY06*	*FY07*	*FY08*	*FY09*
Appraisal estimate (US$M)	3.00	12.00	24.00	37.00	51.00	60.00	60.00	60.00	60.00
Actual (US$M)	0.00	4.78	8.29	19.04	43.33	67.97	67.97	67.72	67.96
Actual as % of appraisal	0.00	39.83	34.54	51.45	84.96	113.28	113.28	112.86	113.26
Date of final disbursement: 02/04/2009									

Project Dates

	Original	Actual
Initiating memorandum	10/28/1999	02/10/2000
Negotiations	03/31/2000	11/02/2000
Board approval	05/26/2000	12/20/2000
Signing	03/01/2001	04/20/2001
Effectiveness	09/28/2001	09/28/2001
Closing date	02/28/2006	03/31/2009

Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
Lending	No. of staff weeks	US$ Thousands (including travel and consultants costs)
FY00	53.77	267
FY01	59.38	185
FY02	41.04	141
Total:	**154.19**	**593**
Supervision/ICR		
FY03	53.52	147
FY04	34.17	112
FY05	27.59	97
FY06	13.20	47
FY07	13.37	57
FY08	15.67	67
FY09	10.29	97
FY10	1.40	25
Total:	**169.21**	**649**

Task Team Members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
John Elder	Lead Social Protection Specialist	AFTH3	TTL
Foluso Okunmadewa	Lead Social Protection Specialist	AFTH3	Project Cycle
Bayo Awosemusi	Lead Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	Procurement
Abiodun Elufioye	Program Assistant	AFCW2	ACS
Muraino Olaseni Ogunsanya	Consultant	AFTFM	Financial Management
Anne Okigbo Sr.	Operations Officer	AFTH3	
Nicole Hamon	Program Assistant	AFTH2	ACS
Barbara Machado	Program Assistant	AFTH2	ACS
Roy Canagarajah	Lead Economist	ECSP1	Poverty Targeting
Anthony Martin Hegarty	Chief Financial Management Officer	OPCFM	Financial Management
Steen Lau Jorgensen	Sector Director	MNSHD	
Myrina McCullough	Operations Analyst	AFTH3	

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
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Jennifer Sara	Sector Leader	LSCSD	
Haddy Jatou Sey	Social Development Spec.	ENVCF	
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T. Mpoy-Kamulayi	Lead Counsel	LEGAF	Legal
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Christophe Prevost	Sr. Water & Sanitation Spec.	ETWSA	
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Joseph Olayemi	Consultant	AFTH3	CDD Approach
Amit Dar	Sector Manager	SASED	
Rosemary Cubagee	Consultant	AFTH3	
Supervision/ICR			
Foluso Okunmadewa	Lead Social Protection Specialist	AFTSP	TTL
John Elder	Lead Social Protection Specialist	AFTSP	TTL
Anne Okigbo	Sr. Operations Officer	AFTHE	
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Olatunde Adekola	Sr. Education Spec.	AFTED	
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Africa Olojoba Sr.	Environmental Specialist	AFTEN	Safeguards
Shakirudeen Onasanya	Consultant	AFTH3	Environment
Samantha De Silva Sr.	Social Protection Specialist	HDNSP	Community Contracting
Abiodun Falusi	Consultant	AFTH3	
Shakirudeen Odunuga	Consultant	AFTH3	
Myrina McCullough	Consultant	AFTSP	ICR Editor
Adewumi Cosmas Adekoya	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	Financial Mgmt

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
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Bolarinwa Omonona	Consultant	AFTH3	
Sulaiman Adesina Yusuf	Consultant	AFTSP	
Labayo Kolawola Kazeem	Consultant	AFTSP	
Joyce Olubukola Agunbiade	Consultant	AFTFM	
Lynne Sherburne-Benz	Sector Manager	AFTSP	
Yasser El-Gammal	Cluster Leader	AFTSP	
Anne Anglio	Senior Program Assistant	AFTSP	
Therese M. Diomi	Consultant	AFTSP	
Abiodun Elufioye	Program Assistant	AFCW2	ACS

Annex B. List of Persons Met

Mrs. Abidemi Aremu, Deputy Director (IDA), Federal Ministry of Finance, Abuja.

Mr. J. O. Adeniran, Representative Federal Ministry of Finance, Federal Ministry of Finance, Abuja.

Mrs. Chidi Ikpechukwu, , Federal Ministry of Finance, Abuja.

Mr. Simon B. Harry, Assistant Director, National Bureau of Statistics, Corporate Planning & Tech. Coord. Dept., Abuja.

Mr. Ichedi S. J, Economist/Statistician, National Bureau of Statistics , Abuja.

Mr. Chudi M. Onuoha, National Coordinator, Community and Social Development Project (CSDP), Abuja.

Mr. Ladipo Samuel, Assistant Director, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. S A Okedare, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mrs. Margaret Tinuke Erinile, Deputy Director Community Development Officer, Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. Ajayi Osuolale, Permanent Secretary, Civil Service Commission, Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. Garba Ismaila, Desk Officer (Education), Ministry of Education and Human Community Development, Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. I. O. Sulaiman, Desk Officer (Water), Ministry of Water Resources, Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. Saka Dauda, Director of Personnel Management, Local Government Authority, Asa, Asa LGA.

Mr. Usman Akanbi, Kwara State FADAMA Project Coordinator, FADAMA Project, Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. M. A. Sumaila, General Manager, CPRP, CSDP, Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. M. O. Alabi, Head of Operations, CPRP (currently Operations Manager CSDP), Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. Hassan Hammed Ohaolapo, M&E Manager, CSDP, Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. J. K. Oyeleke, Program Officer M&E, CPRP (currently CSDP, same title), Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. A. E. Kuranga, Program Officer Supervision, CPRP (currently Program Officer Appraisal and Supervision, CSDP), Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. Johnson Tunde Odedele, Chairman of the Governing Board, CSDP, Ilorin, Kwara State.

Mr. Tunde Adekola, Senior Education Specialist, World Bank, Abuja.

Mr. Foluso Okunmadewa, Lead Social Protection Specialist, World Bank, Abuja.

Micro-projects visited

(A) **Education Projects**

1. Government Day Secondary School, Airport, Ilorin (Ilorin West LGA)
2. Ilorin Comprehensive High School (ICOHS) Ilorin (Ilorin West LGA)
3. Barakat Community Secondary School, Ilorin (Ilorin West LGA)
4. Barakat Community Secondary School, Ilorin (Ilorin West LGA)
5. Banii Community Secondary School, Ilorin (Ilorin West LGA)
6. Share LGEA Primary School (Ifelodun LGA)
7. Ogbondoroko Community Secondary School, Ogbondoroko (Asa LGA)

(B) **Water Project**

8. Ifeosowapo (Okekere) motorised Borehole (Ilorin West LGA)
9. Abayawo Community Motorised Borehole (Ilorin West LGA)
10. Oja-Gbooro Community Motorised Borehole (Ilorin East LGA)
11. Ori Okoh Community Motorised Borehole (Ilorin West LGA)
12. Oke Oyi Community Motorised Borehole (Ilorin East LGA)
13. Dugbanji Community Motorised Borehole (Edu LGA)
14. Egii Oyo Po Community Motorised Borehole (Irepodun LGA)
15. Bokungi Community Motorised Borehole (Edu)

(C) **Electricity Project**

16. Sentu Community Electricity Project (Ilorin East LGA)

(D) **Health Project**

17. Imosokan Community Health Centre (Ifelodun LGA)